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The revolutions of the so-called Arab Spring, starting in 2010 in Tunisia and 
subsequently slopping to Egypt and Libya in 2011 have, amongst others, particularly 
posed the question, if the establishment of democratic political systems in the Islamic 
Arab World is possible. In Egypt, for example, where this paper focuses on, three 
factors apparently make it at least more than difficult to install a stable democratic 
system: first, the country’s authoritarian past, going back thousands of years, during 
which godlike Pharaohs in ancient times, brutally ruling sultans in the middle ages, 
despotic khedives and kings in the 19th and first half of the 20th century and finally 
dictatorial military rulers since 1952 have repressed each kind of political opposition; 
second, Islam, the country’s dominant religion, seems to be incompatible with 
democratic values as Europeans understand them, like tolerance towards (e.g. 
religious) minorities, a plural society and diversity of opinion; and third, the term 
democracy itself is discredited amongst a lot of the Egyptian people, which has been 
oppressed and exploited by western democracies: From the British occupation in 
1882 up to the first half of the 20th century the British Empire, symbol for one of the 
oldest western democracies, ruled more or less through the British General Consul 
and “advisor” to the Egyptian Viceroy, and since the Western patronized foundation 
of the Jewish State in 1948 and the Suez Crisis of 1956, up to the resignation of 
president Mubarak, many Egyptians felt menaced by Western, in particular American 
“Imperialism”. 
Since this is a master thesis for Global History, it strives to find participatory elements 
in the state not only in the intellectual world of Arab-Islamic respectively Egyptian 
thinking but also in the way, how Western people consider them. Democracy is 
definitely a Western term and the author of this paper, being Austrian, grew up with 
(Middle) European ideas of democracy. It could be considered problematically, that 
Western conceptions of and associations with this issue might not cope with 
specifically Egyptian notions of “democracy”. But it is in fact not the aim of this paper 
to avoid European connotations. Moreover, the author’s Western background and 
knowledge is part of the global method applied in it, besides the fact that European 
ideas actually spread to Egypt since the early 19th century, and that democracy also 
could be and definitely was time and again defined not only as a (Western) concept 
?4 
for politics but also as the most adequate way for individual human beings to gain 
freedom and strive for personal self-realization. Facing the menace of totalitarian 
regimes in many countries all over the world, John Dewey stated in his 
groundbreaking book “Freedom and Culture” in 1939, “Dispositions formed under 
such conditions are so inconsistent with the democratic method that in a crisis they 
may be aroused to act in positively anti-democratic ways for anti-democratic ends; 
just as resort to coercive force and suppression of civil liberties are readily palliated in 
nominally democratic communities when the cry is raised that ‘law and order’ are 
threatened.”1 Nevertheless, he concluded, “that self-governing institutions are the 
means by which human nature can secure its fullest realization in the greatest 
number of persons.”2 Moreover, Dewey stated, “But that which is its weakness at 
particular times is its strength in the long course of human history. Just because the 
cause of democratic freedom is the cause of the fullest possible realization of human 
potentialities, the latter when they are suppressed and oppressed will in time rebel 
and demand an opportunity for manifestation.”3 
Besides, the author’s view on this subject is naturally based on terms like 
constitutionalism and separation of power as defined by John Locke and 
Montesquieu, the system of “checks and balances” as it is represented in the 
Constitution of the United States of America, and ideas on a “society treaty” as 
described already by Locke and later on by Rousseau. “’Trouver une forme 
d’association qui défende et protege [sic] de toute la force commune la personne et 
les biens de chaque associé, et par laquelle chacun s’unissant à tous n’obéisse 
pourtant qu’à lui-même et reste aussi libre qu’auparavant?’ Tel est le problême [sic] 
fondamental dont le contract [sic] social donne la solution.” 4 , which Rousseau 
defined as follows, “Chacun de nous met en commun sa personne et toute sa 
puissance sous la suprême direction de la volonté générale; et nous recevons en 
corps chaque member comme partie indivisible de tout.”5 Freedom of expression and 
a free press, more or less realized at first in England at the end of the 17th and 
subsequently in Denmark and in the US-constitution in the late 18th century, are 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??John Dewey, Freedom and Culture (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1939), 129.?
2 Dewey, Freedom and Culture,130. 
?Dewey, Freedom and Culture,129.?
4 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, „Du contrat social,“ in Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Oeuvres 
complètes, ed. (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1964), 360. 
5 Rousseau, Du contrat social, 361. 
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concepts which will be considered as well as the positioning of women in society, 
which has been a topic already for Montesquieu (who, interestingly, refers to the 
suppression of women in “Oriental despotism” as a characteristics for authoritarian 
rule6) but of course much more for John Stuart Mill a hundred years later. Finally the 
term Human Rights and the treatment of minorities will be an issue that has to be 
kept in mind, and here the author’s thinking is also determined by Western concepts 
like James Madison’s “Bill of Rights”, which had an enormous impact on the French 
Revolutionary Human Rights Declaration, as well as his Federation No. 10. 
Political ideologies like Nationalism, Socialism, Liberalism, but also Islamism and 
Panarabism are no less global phenomena than the influence of foreigners in Egypt. 
Being the transmitters of such ideologies, they played a significant role in spreading 
these. And finally, European (in particular French) juridical principles had a huge 
impact on Egyptian law since the first half of the 19th century, when Mehmed Ali sent 
scholars to Europe, and especially to France, to study foreign languages and 
European administrative structures. 
At the same time political life in Egypt itself was and today still is characterized by 
several fields of tension: between authoritarian rule and attempts for participation, 
between Islam and secular ideas, between Western democratic ideas and basic 
human values like justice, freedom, equality and responsibility, which vice versa were 
and still are more or less also claimed to be genuine Islamic, and between reforms 
according to European patterns as considered necessary for building a nation and a 
strong economy on the one hand and a simultaneously latent rejection of the values 
represented by colonial and imperial powers. In this connection it will also be an 
issue that European influence on the one hand initiated and strengthened democratic 
developments but on the other hand also hampered them, since for instance the 
British Empire also saw its interests endangered by an Egyptian parliament that 
might be a too strong opponent to the British “advised” Viceroy. Finally it will be 
shown that Western ideas on democracy did in fact grow in Egypt, but until today 
they never could and probably will for many decades in the future not be able to 
challenge respectively overthrow many Islamic as well as local traditions. Therefore 
an “Islamic democracy” will definitely look different than many people in Western 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
6 Melvin Richter, The political theory of Montesquieu (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977), 45-51. 
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countries wish it to be. That’s why the author chose not to use the term “democracy” 
but the Arab word ىروش (shura) in the main title of this paper, to underline the 
different notion of participation in the Arab-Islamic context – a word, which means not 
only “consultation”, “deliberation”, “taking counsel”, “counsel” or “advice”7, but also 
“participation”.8 
This master thesis cannot provide a comprehensive and detailed analysis of every 
aspect of the subject. Moreover it tries to give an overview about the most important 
developments that led to democratic institutions and structures in Egypt since the 
19th century. Though nationalist, socialist, liberal and constitutional ideas existed, of 
course, parallel, each one of these ideologies had its heydays more or less in one 
period of modern Egyptian history. Therefore the author decided to keep a 
chronological path through the last two hundred years and concentrate on one of 
these subjects in each section. 
The first chapter focuses on the uprising for modernity during the era of Mehmed Ali 
and his successors, whereas the second chapter concentrates on political 
movements in the late 19th and early 20th century, which had a significant impact on 
participatory consciousness in the Egyptian’s thinking. The Urabi Revolt, foregoing 
the British occupation of 1882 and the subsequent British control of the country, 
stands for the early nationalist movement, which culminated in the Revolution of 
1919 and the founding of the Wafd Party. Meanwhile, many European foreigners, 
particularly Greeks and Italians as well as Armenians and Jews, but also, of course, 
British and French, influenced political thinking mainly of the leftist in Cairo and even 
more in Alexandria. Finally the Liberal movement had a main impact on Egyptian law 
and constitutionalism. The third chapter deals especially with the political changes 
after the 1952 military coup, the tentative reforms President Sadat initiated and the 
Mubarak era with its so-called “Pharaonic Political System”, which stands for a sham 
democracy with a National Assembly and political parties that were, due to several 
reasons to be described, not at all acting as a democratic control on the government. 
Nevertheless, it was this lack of official opposition that strengthened civil society 
since the early 2000s and which finally led to the revolution of January and February 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
7 Hans Wehr, A dictionary of modern written Arabic, ed. J. Milton Cowan 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1961), 492. 
8 Gudrun Krämer, Demokratie im Islam: Der Kampf für Toleranz und Freiheit in der 
arabischen Welt (Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2011), 56, 59,119. 
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2011. In the final chapter the role of civil society organizations as well as Islam and 
its political arms, both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi, will be dealt with, who 
together have won more than 70% of the National Assembly seats in the first real 
democratic elections taking place in late 2011/early 2012 and who also gained a 
victory in the first presidential elections after the Revolution of 2011 with the Muslim 
Brother’s candidate Mohamed Morsi (52% of the votes). 
Summarizing, this paper aims to find out which participatory elements, from a 
European perspective, can be found in the Egyptian state since the 19th century, 
which genuine local institutions and traditions made and still make participation 
possible, and which role do particularly Islamic defined values play in the 
development of a specific “Egyptian Islamic democracy”. This paper is based on 
historical and political literature and local research in Cairo, Alexandria and Luxor 
including interviews with politicians and political activists as well as revolutionary 
graffiti of the last two years referring to historical and political aspects of the subject. 
The reader may excuse divergent writings in particular of transliterated Arabic 






1. Egypt’s uprising for modernity in the 19th century 
1.1 Mehmed Ali: modernization with unforeseen aftermaths 
 
“But the introduction of western organization into the armies of the Levant 
brought with it other important results, for the appliances of mechanical art, 
of education, of medical knowledge, and several system of dependence 
and subordination, were the needful companions of the new state of things. 
The transfer of the military power from unruly and undisciplined hordes to a 
body of troops regularly trained through the various grades of obedience 
and discipline, was in itself the establishment of a principle of order which 
spread over the whole surface of society.”9 
 
The rule of Mohamed (Turkish: Mehmed) Ali Pasha (1805-1848) is commonly 
associated with the start of modern Egyptian history and major reforms in the 
country’s economy and politics. It is doubtlessly true that, after the Napoleonic 
invasion (1798-99) and the failed British attempt to occupy Egypt only a few years 
later (1807), Mehmed Ali, the new Wali (governor) of the Ottoman province, “gave 
Egypt the organizational basis and the human cadres for the emergence of a modern 
state”.10 Having faced the obvious superiority not only of European armies and 
weapons but also of European administration and economy, he “introduced a system 
of state education in order to provide the trained and skilled manpower required by 
the services of his state, and especially his armed forces. He reformed the 
administration in order to secure efficient, strict and economical control over the 
functions of state and government.”11 In fact, the main focus of Mehmed Ali’s reforms 
was never to make Egypt an independent nation state modeled by European 
patterns. As Vatikiotis put it, “nationality was an unknown concept to the Pasha”, who 
only perceived “the extension of his power and authority as the governor of an 
Ottoman province at the expense of his master in Istanbul.”12 Nor was it his intention 
to prepare the ground for a constitutional government system of the country. Sir John 
Bowring (1792-1872), MP and later British consul in Canton and governor of Hong 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
9 John Bowring, Report on Egypt 1823-1838 under the reign of Mohamed Ali 
(London: Triade Exploration Ltd., 1998), 137. 
10 Panayotis J. Vatikiotis, The History of Egypt from Muhammad Ali to Mubarak 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969/1986), 52. 
11 Vatikiotis, The History of Egypt, 50. 
12 Vatikiotis, The History of Egypt, 67. 
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Kong, met Mehmed Ali during his travel through Egypt and the Middle East in 1838. 
In his “Report on Egypt 1823-1838 under the reign of Mohamed Ali” he cites the Wali 
of Egypt in a conversation with him as follows: “In your country you must have a 
great many hands to move the machine of state; I move it with my own. I do not 
always exactly see what is best to be done, but when I do see it I compel prompt 
obedience to my wishes, and what is seemingly best is done.”13 
Nevertheless, the reforms and measures initiated by Mehmed Ali caused 
unpredictable consequences for the future of the Egyptian state and the national as 
well as political consciousness of its population. Modernizing his army, which was 
Mehmed Ali’s main concern, “did unwittingly contribute to the rise of Egyptian 
nationalism”14 by bringing tens of thousands of Egyptians, mostly fellahin, common 
experiences in their military service as well as by the slow but irresistible rise of 
Egyptians in military ranks and their rivalry against the officer corps so far exclusively 
held by Ottomans. Inevitably, the army reform also led to a program of education. 
Schools were opened in Egypt where not only military knowledge but also other 
sciences were taught, and the most talented Egyptians were sent abroad for 
technical and academic training – to Italy and England, but mainly to France. “Thus 
the army became the impetus for a wide programme of education of a new, secular 
nature.”15 Several European Missionary Schools were also prominent in educating a 
new elite for serving as state officials, and Bowring mentions even a girl’s school, 
attached to the boys’ school of the Church Missionary Society, where about 100 
scholars, “under the direction of Miss Holliday, who has been sent to Egypt at the 
charge of the Ladies’ Society for promoting Female Education in the East”, were 
trained mostly in needle work, which thereafter became famous in the Pasha’s harem. 
Soon, also the women of the vice-regal family were eagerly practicing this skill. 
Bowring, convinced, that “it is impossible civilization or improvement, should make 
much progress in the East until the female sex are elevated from their degraded 
position” confidently argues that this sort of education “will create the appetite for 
instruction of a higher character.”16 The beginning of Egyptian book publishing in 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
13 Bowring, Report on Egypt, 381. 
14 Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, his army and the making of 
modern Egypt (Cairo/New York: The American University in Cairo Press, 2003), 268. 
15 Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot, A History of Egypt: From the Arab Conquest to the 
Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985/2007), 68. 
16 Bowring, Report on Egypt, 356. 
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1822, when the first state printing press was founded in Bulaq, and the first 
publication of the Khedivial Journal five years later – though it was a propaganda 
newspaper for the governmental policy – marked the start of an increasingly 
sophisticated press, represented by journals like the Official Gazette (al-waqa’I al-
misriyya, first published in 1828) or the French Le Moniteur Egyptien (1832-33).17 
Educational missions of talented Egyptian students started already in 1816, and ten 
years later, in April 1826, for the first time 40 students were sent to France to be 
taught in military and civil administration, artillery, chemistry and medicine but also in 
law, economy, translation and in arts like etching and lithography.18 Subsequent 
educational missions to Paris followed in 1829, 1830 and 1832, and in 1833 the 
Egyptian school there had 115 students, one of the most remarkable being Rifaa Rafi 
al-Tahtawi (1801-1873), son of a prominent family from Sohag in Upper Egypt, who 
had studied before at Al-Azhar University in Cairo.19 In this connection it should be 
remembered that also the patriarchal Al-Azhar with its traditional subjects taught and 
teaching methods underwent a significant change in the times of Mehmed Ali. The 
Wali appointed his friend Hasan al-Attar (d. 1833) Shaykh of the Azhar, who sought 
to improve teaching methods there and, moreover, interest his students in new 
knowledge. “Conditions in our country must change,” al-Attar is reported to have said, 
and “We must introduce new knowledge that is yet unknown in Egypt.” 20 
Nevertheless, the Azhar increasingly lost its privileged position as the leading 
institution for education both to the new schools and colleges founded by the 
government as well as to Italian, French, British and American mission schools, 
whose graduates “came to constitute the membership of the modern Europeanized 
group of government officials, professionals and politicians [?] They came to speak 
and think in terms of European-inspired models of life and society, and often stood in 
direct opposition to the traditional cultural norm represented by the Azhar and its 
institutions [?].”21 Rifaa Tahtawi, the Azharite who went to Paris from 1826 to 1831, 
did not focus on technical studies there like Ali Pasha Mubarak (1823-1893), the 
other dominate Egyptian transmitting European knowledge to his home country, but 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
17 Vatikiotis, The History of Egypt, 99. 
18 Caroline Gaultier-Kurhan, Mehemet Ali et la France 1805-1849; histoire singulière 
du Napoleon de l’orient (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2005), 125-127. 
19 Gaultier-Kurhan, Mehemet Ali et la France, 127-128. 
20 Ali Mubarak, Khitat, IV, 38, as quoted in Vatikiotis, The History of Egypt, 92. 
21 Vatikiotis, The History of Egypt, 103. 
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on the translation of French literature as well as political and philosophical texts.22 “Il 
étudie et traduit des ouvrages qui représentent la rationalité politique (au sens large) 
et philosophique de l’âge des Lumières : de Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des Lois et les 
Considérations sur les Causes de la grandeur des Romains et leur décadence : de 
Rousseau, le Contrat social, les Aventures de Télémaque.“ 23  Rifaa became a 
veritable cultural ambassador between France and Egypt: “Il observe la société 
parisienne et se montre curieux de tout. Il côtoie des orientalistes comme Sylvestre 
de Sacy, Caussin de Perceval. Il note toutes ses impressions dans son journal de 
voyage et cherche à comprendre la civilisation européenne.“24 He observed the 
Revolution 1830 in Paris and translated excerpts of the then French Constitution La 
Charte into Arabic in his “Paris Journal”, rendering it “al-sharta”. Moreover, he also 
translated secular legal studies and jurisprudence like the French Civil Code, which 
had not only a huge influence on Egyptian law under the reign of Ismail Pasha, “who 
was anxious to copy European legal codes”25, but also in the following decades, and 
to some extent even until today. 
Foreigners, also Europeans, could exert some influence on certain juridical cases 
since Mehmed Ali’s time. Bowring informs us, that already in 1826 a commercial 
court was established in Cairo “to settle all commercial disputes between rayahs 
(native Christians) and between rayahs and Europeans, Europeans being plaintiffs. 
[?] The members of the tribunal are chosen from among the different nations who 
are fixed in Egypt; there are two Turkish merchants, three Egyptians, two Mogrebis, 
two Greek Levantines, two Schismatic Greek, two Armenians, two Jews. A Turkish 
merchant presides.” 26  He adds, that a similar tribunal had been established in 
Alexandria, the most cosmopolitan city of Egypt, which regained its importance as 
the leading center of trade under Mehmed Ali. In the following chapter we will see 
how this foreign influence on Egyptian law was extended in the so-called “Mixed 
Courts” during the reign of Ismail Pasha. Mehmed Ali, by the way, promulgated penal 
legislation of his own, independently from the High Porte, and in the most 
comprehensive laws of these, the Jam’iyya haqqaniyya of 1844, “went further than 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
22 Vatikiotis, The History of Egypt, 113. 
23 G. Delanoue, Les Lumières et l’ombre dans l’Égypte du XIXème siècle. Limites 
d’une acculturation in Le miroir égyptien, op. Cit, as quoted in Gaultier-Kurhan, 
Mehemet Ali et la France, 128-29. 
24 Gaultier-Kurhan, Mehemet Ali et la France, 129. 
25 Vatikiotis, The History of Egypt, 113-14. 
26 Bowring, Report on Egypt, 306. 
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any previous law in its departure from the Shari’a.”27 Bowring, however, reminds us 
of the universal significance of the Koran as the paramount law referred to in all 
Muslim countries, and he remarks: “Indeed, so blind is the respect for all its [the 
Koran’s] teachings, that it would be scarcely possible to introduce a system of 
philosophical jurisprudence in the East, unless it could be in some manner or other 
connected with the teaching of the prophet.”28 Considering the situation in Egypt after 
the Revolution of 2011 and the results of the first free parliamentary and presidential 
elections of 2012, it turns out that this statement still has some validity, at least for 
the mass of poor educated people in the country. 
It is also in the countryside, where traditional dignitaries, namely the sheikhs, since 
Mehmed Ali’s times (and long before) nowadays still play a significant role as local 
authorities, being equipped with “unofficial” juridical power for personal disputes in 
their villages. During Mehmed Ali’s reign, “The native Egyptian notables (ayan), who 
had been village heads (sheikh al-balad or umda) under the mamluks, were used by 
the new administration and entrusted with collecting the taxes and generally 
representing the government at the village level. To reward the rural administrators 
for their new functions they were given grants of land [?]“29 The government in Cairo 
also expected the village sheikhs to support the conscription officers in their task, but 
apparently they often were not collaborating: “The different local officials, from the 
shaykhs to the department governors, often refused to hand in the men needed for 
the army to the conscripting officers and instead allowed them to ‘disappear’ in their 
provinces and sometimes gave them refuge by hiding them in their own houses.”30 
No doubt, the sheikhs were financially rewarded for hiding deserters, who mostly just 
could not leave their poor fellahin families for decades (it was not before 1835, that 
the army service was limited to 15 years31), but nevertheless it shows that in some 
fields the central government could not at all or only partly implement its power to the 
local level. Traditionally, the rural shaykhs where elected by their village community, 
but at least under the reign of Ismail, the Mudirs (local high officials) intervened if not 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
27 J. N. D. Anderson, “Law Reform in Egypt: 1850-1950“ in Political and Social 
Change in Modern Egypt, ed. Peter M. Holt (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 
210. 
28 Bowring, Report on Egypt, 320. 
29 Al-Sayyid Marsot, A History of Egypt, 69. 
30 Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men, 105. 
31 Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men, 262. 
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satisfied with their choice32. Bowring tells us that also in the cities the sheikhs still 
played an important role in Mehmed Ali’s time. There were, e.g. in Cairo, 164 guilds 
or corporations, each one headed by a sheikh, “who is invested with a certain 
jurisdiction over its members [?] and there is a superior sheikh, the sheikh of the 
sheikhs, who purchases his situation from the government, and who exercises a 
superordinate authority over the whole.”33 At the same time this system provided the 
Pasha and his government some control over large parts of individuals all over the 
country for villagers, residents of a city quarter, believers, and all the workers 
belonging to one of the various corporations of any profession recognized the 
authority of their particular sheikhs, who, furthermore, had a right to access to the 
Pasha.34 Moreover, until the last quarter of the 19th century, the shaykhs of the guilds 
in the cities were responsible for the collection and payment of taxes by their guild 
members.35 Even today, in the countryside the authority of the hereditary village 
sheikhs is in local affairs stronger than the one exercised by the local governor. In 
Mehmed Ali’s time, as we have seen, this authority sometimes was used against the 
central authority, when “some shaykhs managed through various ways to side with 
their fellow villagers rather than act as reliable agents of the government in Cairo”.36 
Nevertheless, in most other areas of administration, the Pasha reformed the system 
according to European patterns. Having educated a new generation of military and 
civil servants in the many newly founded schools (e.g. the Military School at Aswan in 
1820, the Medical School in 1827, the School of Languages in 1835, or the 
Engineering School at Bulaq in 1844) Mehmed Ali was able to restructure the 
administration of the country according to his authoritative rule. Therefore he 
“abolished the so-called legislative and consultative bodies established by the French 
occupation, such as the Cairo Council (Diwan), the provincial councils and the 
General Council of Egypt. Instead, he preferred to have a Council of State and a 
Private Council, consisting of the corps of high public officials and ministers, acting 
as executive aides rather than as representatives of the public.”37 It is characteristic 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
32 Alexander Schölch, Ägypten den Ägyptern! Die politische und gesellschaftliche 
Krise der Jahre 1878-1882 in Ägypten (Freiburg i. Br.: Atlantis Verlag, 1972), 43. 
33 Bowring, Report on Egypt, 307. 
34 Bowring, Report on Egypt, 309. 
35 Gabriel Baer, “Social Change in Egypt: 1800-1914,“ in Political and Social Change 
in Modern Egypt, ed. Peter M. Holt (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 143. 
36 Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men, 105. 
37 Vatikiotis, The History of Egypt, 63. 
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for the non-constitutional rule of Mehmed Ali, that in 1837, six ministries were 
established (Interior, Public Instruction, War, Finance, Foreign Affairs – this one 
already in 1833 –, and Commerce and Navy), but there was no kind of National 
Assembly so far in Egypt. 
Nevertheless, Mehmed Ali laid the foundations for a new, modern Egypt with a self-
confident autochthone population – he “[e]gyptianized Egypt, although he himself did 
not plan to do that and never knew that he had done it.”38 It is true that the Khedive 
himself saw this modernization process in the army and administration of his country 
only as a means for his power politics against the Sultan and the establishment of a 
strong dynasty, but without doubt, “the consequences of the Pasha’s pursuit of power 
and dominion constituted the essential foundations of the development of modern 
Egypt – both as a state and a society.”39 The German historian Adolf Hasenclever 
wrote in 1917 in a more poetic way, comparing Mehmed Ali with the biblical Moses, 
“der mit seinem Stab an den harten Felsen schlug und lebendiges Wasser 
hervorsprudeln ließ.”40 
 
1.2 Europeanization and European intervention 
“The European powers also caused the deposition of Ismail as Khedive by 
the Sultan before the newly formed educated class in Egypt could coalesce 
into a national interest group, with functioning institutions.”41 
After the death of Mehmed Ali, his grandson Abbas I (1848-54), followed by 
Mehmed’s son Said (1854-63), the latter granting Ferdinand de Lesseps the 
concession to dig the Suez Canal in November 1854, and thereafter Mehmed’s 
grandson Ismail (1863-79) came to rule in Egypt. The London Convention of 1840 
and two firmans (decrees by the Sultan) in the following year had granted the 
dynasty extensive autonomy and hereditary rule. Subsequent firmans in 1866, 1867, 
1872 and 1873 reflected the struggle between the High Porte and the Khedive (a title 
which was officially granted by the Sultan in the firman of 1867) about the degree of 
Egypt’s autonomy. In the end, Ismail was allowed to create all necessary institutions 
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for a widely autonomous government and make administrative agreements (not 
treaties) with external powers and to stipulate foreign loans without consulting the 
Sultan. 42  Ismail was, like his grandfather, fascinated by the possibilities of 
administrative reforms according to European patterns, and, moreover, wanted to 
make Egypt a part of Europe.43 During his reign, more and more European educated 
Egyptians became state officials, lawyers, engineers and teachers. They slowly 
started to take over the administration of the country from the former Turkish-
Circassian elite. European-like scientific and cultural institutions, libraries, museums, 
and learned societies, were established. Public works, like telegraph lines, railways, 
irrigation projects and canals were realized (the Suez Canal to be finished in 1869), 
and the major cities like Cairo and Alexandria got a European “facelift”. 
Parallel to these material manifestations of Europeanization, the country underwent 
important social changes. The steadily takeover of higher administrative and 
increasingly also military office from the Turks by Egyptians was only one of these. 
The other one was the decline of the Ulama, the religious elite traditionally working 
as teachers, scholars, qadis and muftis – the so-called “the men of the pen.”44 
Although they retained much of their influence over the religious people, which was, 
still, the vast majority of the population, that majority “was politically negligible, even 
though it was used by absolute rulers whenever they wished to pose as liberals. 
Thus rulers continued to make a show of consulting the ‘ulama’, as a means of 
sanctioning new or unpopular moves.”45 Since Said’s Land Law of 1858, “which 
played a major role in establishing rights of private ownership in land over a great 
part of the country” 46 , it was foremost the families of ‘Umdas (autochthonous 
traditional village leaders), consigned by the Khedive with local administration offices 
even up to mudirs, who could acquire vast pieces of land.47 Moreover, at the same 
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time, rich merchants began to acquire large estates48, and henceforth a rising class 
of notables began to play an important role in Egyptian society. 
All the public works and projects Ismail had initiated, “extravagant though they were, 
aimed at building the productive capacity of the country, but they also cost a great 
deal of money which the country could not supply.”49 During the 19th century, Egypt’s 
traditional subsistence economy was turned into an export-oriented economy.50 
Ismail had expanded e.g. the sugar and cotton industry, the latter being particularly 
profitable during the American Civil War (1861-65), when the United States dropped 
out as the biggest supplier of that commodity.51 But after the end of that war in the 
USA, the prices for cotton fell again, which intensified the financial problems of the 
Khedive, and in the European press in 1865/66 there were even doubts about his 
credit-worthiness.52 
Since Mehmed Ali there was only one advisory board the Khedive consulted 
regularly: his Private Council. Hence, “To help him find a solution to his financial 
difficulties, in 1866 Ismail called the first parliament.”53 The term “parliament” here is 
capable of being misunderstood, because it had in fact no legislative functions and 
did not at all question Ismail’s autocratic rule. Ismail was only “motivated by the need 
to obtain more funds both from taxation and by the contraction of fresh European 
loans.”54 However, on 22 October 1866, Ismail issued two decrees: The first provided 
for a Maglis Shura al-Nuwwab (Consultative Assembly, or Council, of Deputies), 
consisting of 75 members (3 from Cairo, 2 from Alexandria, 1 from Damiette, and, 
according to their population, 1 or 2 from each district), which were to be elected by 
the village shaykhs and the notables of the cities for a three-year term55. The second 
decree, an “organization law”, regulated the internal organization of the Assembly 
and provided rules of debate.56 When Ismail, on 10 November 1866, inaugurated the 
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first session of the chamber, consisting of the richest and most honorable new class 
of landowners and merchants, it was designed rather as an instrument to facilitate 
the burden of government for the monarch according to the principle of shura (which, 
on the occasion of the opening session, Ismail referred to by quoting two suras of the 
Koran) than to be an autonomous institution.57 The episode of this first meeting of the 
Council is characteristic of the delegate’s notion of their duty in this corporate body, 
and it was told not only in the European colonies but also amongst Egyptians many 
years to follow: when the Delegates were told by the Secretary of the Assembly to sit 
in three groups, according to the pattern of European parliaments – “pro government 
on the Right, opposition on the Left, and moderates in the Middle – all the Delegates 
crowded on the Right murmuring, ‘How can we be opposed to the Government?’”.58 
Obviously, they were also driven by fear, since they all knew, that it was highly 
perilous to contradict the Khedive – „Der Sudan war zwar fern, doch für 
Widerspenstige war er nahe, und manchmal starb man, bevor man überhaupt dort 
anlangte”.59 
Though the Khedive, after coming to terms with the Sultan, lost his interest in the 
Chamber of Deputies (it was not convened in 1872, 1874 and 187560, and finally 
suspended in 1879, before Tawfiq resuscitated it in 188161), by the establishment of 
the Assembly, Ismail had opened a “Pandora’s Box”62, because though this first 
parliament “had no teeth, successive parliaments soon developed a life of their 
own.”63 Nevertheless, Ismail presented the newly established Assembly of Deputies 
to the outside world as the peak of his civilization program for Egypt.64 As mentioned 
above, the increasing dependency of Egypt on European, particularly French and 
British, investment, brought Ismail more and more in financial troubles and should, in 
the following years, lead to foreign control and domination of the country.65 However, 
in the Assembly’s four sessions between 1876 and 1897 the Deputies neither 
opposed the Khedive’s financial policy, nor increasing European intrusion, nor did 
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they fight for more constitutional rights. They just sought to act for the financial, 
economical and cultural interests of their provinces.66 
Egypt’s national debt rose from ca. £ 3,5 million at Said’s death up to almost £ 100 
million at the time of Ismail’s deposition from the throne67. One of the reasons for this 
calamitous development were the so called Capitulations, which not only precluded 
about 100.000 foreigners resident in Egypt from taxation, but also from native 
jurisdiction.68 The capitulary system had an age-long tradition in Egypt, was based on 
the principal of personal rather than territorial nature of law, reached back to 1500, 
the late Mamluk period, and was pursued by the Ottoman Empire.69 It privileged 
foreign merchants, e.g. from France, England, Austria-Hungary, Russia, the USA and 
others70, and guaranteed, that the defendant’s court had jurisdiction in all cases. In 
criminal cases, for instance, “the consular courts claimed jurisdiction in any case in 
which one of their nationals, or even ‘protected persons’, was accused.”71 In 1875, 
the Armenian Nubar Pasha, then Minister of Foreign Affairs and later Prime Minister 
of Egypt for three times (1878-79, 1884-88 and 1894-95), suggested the 
establishment of courts organized along the lines of the existing “mixed” courts of 
Alexandria and Cairo.72 These Mixed Courts, which started to work on 1 January 
1876, legitimated creditors to foreclose a land for the non-payment of a debt, for 
which reason many fellahs lost their land to their creditors73, and eventually tied the 
hands of the government in financial matters with their verdicts.74 
His financial problems had led Ismail already in 1871 to decree the Muqabala Law, 
which freed any landowner, who paid his taxes six years in advance from half his 
liability of taxes and also granted rights of full ownership. 75  Since not enough 
landowners opted for this scheme, the law’s provisions were made compulsory three 
years later, but this new tax also did not solve the problem of overflowing national 
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debts.76 The sale of his Suez Canal shares for £ 4 million in 1875 to the British 
government was also only a drop in the bucket. Egypt was irresistibly moving 
towards bankruptcy, and European creditors began to fear for their interests.77 In the 
following year this led to the Goschen-Joubert mission and to the establishment of 
the “Caisse de la Dette Publique”, a special department consisting of representatives 
from the four chief bondholding countries (England, France, Austria and Italy), which 
ensured the service of the debt.78 Finally, on 18 November 1876, the so-called “Dual 
Control” was institutionalized, and with it the appointment of two European 
Controllers (an Englishman and a Frenchman), one supervising the receipts and the 
other the expenditures of the country. Schölch gets to the point by stating, „Ägypten 
wurde einer ‘Zwangsschuldenverwaltung’, ja einer ‘verschleierten europäischen 
Kolonialherrschaft’ unterworfen.”79 
Two years later, on 30 March 1878, a “Commission of Inquiry” was appointed 
(including Major Baring, later 1st Earl of Cromer and, between the British occupation 
of Egypt in 1882 and 1907 the first British Consul-General), to examine all sources of 
revenue and expenditure80. In a detailed preliminary report from 20 August 1878 this 
Commission recommended a multitude of financial, administrative and political 
reforms to foster Egypt’s progress and to advance its administration – mainly, of 
course, to make it a most profitable domain of European creditors.81 Here it becomes 
evident why all the juridical and financial historical details mentioned above must be 
considered in order to understand the following events and their influence on the 
further development of the political system of Egypt. In their efforts to optimize the 
financial profit of their “cash cow” Egypt, the British and French controllers forced the 
Khedive to accept political changes towards constitutionalism and a limitation of his 
power – measures they soon should regret and which finally should lead to the 
occupation of the country only four years later. 
The Khedive, who, during his whole reign, had strived for more independence from 
Constantinople, knew that not only the Powers, but also the Sultan was fancying the 
idea of his deposition, and he had no financial means left to bribe the Padishah for 
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any support. Thus he accepted to recall Nubar Pasha from Europe (Ismail had exiled 
his Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1876) to head an Egyptian government, where 
European ministers served for the first time. Besides the English Sir Rivers Wilson as 
Minister of Finance and the French M de Blignières as Minister of Public Works, 
many European officials were appointed at high salaries.82 More important for the 
constitutional future of Egypt was the fact, “that Ismail was forced to accept the 
principle of ministerial responsibility for the first time.”83 Schölch, however, relativizes 
this declaration from a constitutional perspective, because in the Egyptian documents 
only the term “ministerial independence” can be found, revealing Ismail’s real 
intention behind his decree of 23 August 1878, establishing this Maglis al-Nuzzar as 
a responsible Cabinet84: The Khedive did not want to be identified in any way with 
this government, and hence not take over any responsibility for any of its failures 
(which, as he hoped, would soon occur). Moreover, the government was not 
responsible constitutionally to anyone – neither to the Khedive, nor to the Assembly 
of Deputies, nor to the Egyptian people. Therefore, the term “ministerial responsibility” 
served the Control Powers only as a verbal fig leaf for the mixed government, which 
the American Consul General accurately defined as an “irresponsible ministry in the 
interests of foreign creditors.”85 Nevertheless, some substantial changes should not 
be underestimated: the decisions of the ministers were now taken by majority vote; 
and not the Khedive, but the Chief Minister from now on presided over the Cabinet.86 
Ismail, however, felt humiliated by the grip of the foreigners on his dignity and power, 
and sought, by promising further constitutional concessions, the support of the 
Assembly of Deputies, which the Chamber willingly offered. On 3 February 1879, the 
Assembly attacked a governmental decree, which had been issued by the Cabinet 
four weeks before, at the urging of the two European ministers and against Nubar’s 
resistance. The Assembly used this decree for protesting against their general 
disregard by the ministers, who never had consulted them regarding any matter, and 
alleged, that the Khedive, on the contrary, had always respected and consulted them. 
Twelve days later, Prime Minister Nubar resigned.87 The Crown Prince, Tawfiq Pasha, 
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was then accepted from the Powers as a compromise premier, but both alien 
ministers remained in the cabinet and therefore, European financial control continued. 
Moreover, the Minister of Finance, Sir Wilson, planned to declare national 
insolvency.88 
Ismail now intended to use the notables of the Maglis al-Nuwwab (Assembly of 
Deputies) for regaining his autocratic power: He offered constitutional concessions to 
the Assembly Deputies, who desired extended rights regarding the control of 
financial matters, if they would sign his alternative national budgetary plan and 
generally act against European intrusion. This alternative plan, the so-called La’iha 
Wataniya, which was issued on 2 April and signed by 73 civil servants, 93 high rank 
army officers, 60 ‘Ulama from Cairo, Alexandria and Damietta, the Coptic Patriarch 
and the Jewish Chief Rabbi, 41 notables from Cairo and Damietta as well as 60 
members of the Maglis al-Nuwwab, included a petition of the Deputies claiming the 
same rights European parliaments had regarding financial and domestic matters for 
the Maglis, a new, European-like electoral law, and the responsibility of the Cabinet 
in both financial and domestic matters to the Assembly of Deputies (its presiding 
minister still to be appointed and the other ministers to be confirmed by the Khedive). 
Certainly, in Ismail’s declaration of 5 April, there is no word about this extension of 
responsibility for the Maglis.89 
By the late 1870s there existed already several secret societies both among civilians 
(notables, ministers and journalists) and army officers. Many political leaders like 
Sharif Pasha, Azharites like the later famous Saad Zaghlul, intellectuals and 
journalists like Muhammad Abduh and army officers like Ahmad Urabi were 
particularly influenced by the popular Islamic reformer and political agitator Jamal al-
Din al-Afghani, claiming “reforms ranging from demands for equality before the law, 
to ministerial responsibility and certain aspects of civil liberty.”90 The delegates of the 
Assembly, formally in solution, continued to meet privately in Helwan and formed the 
so-called “National Society”, later to be known as the “Helwan Society”.91 All these 
secret societies like “Young Egypt”, founded in 1879 by journalists and intellectuals in 
Alexandria, or another “National Society”, formed in the same year by some Egyptian 
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officers92, may be seen as the forerunners of political parties in Egypt before the First 
World War. 
Ismail, of course, sought the support of these groups. On 8 April 1879, he appointed 
a “truly Egyptian” government, consisting, however, only of Turko-Circassian 
ministers of the old school and headed by Sharif Pasha, a member of the “Helwan 
Society”, thus alarming the European Powers.93 The Khedive, in a “sudden national-
constitutional enthusiasm”, ordered Sharif Pasha to submit a draft constitution (17 
May 1879). It was the most liberal so far, “drawn up by Sharif and his Austrian 
adviser, a Dr. Keller, and on June 2, the Chamber was given a new electoral law. 
The new draft constitution stipulated freedom of speech for the delegates and gave 
the Chamber a veto over laws issued by the Council of Ministers.”94 But England and 
France had, by this time, already decided to force Ismail to resign in favor of his son 
Tawfiq, and on 26 June 1879 both of them received accordingly telegrams from the 
Sultan, who had given in the pressure of both powers.95 The draft constitution, 
however, should become the basis for the constitution promulgated on 31 December 
1881, which will be mentioned in the next chapter. 
Like his grandfather Mehmed Ali, Ismail was an autocratic ruler, but his policy of 
Europeanization and modernization was extremely expensive. Karl Baron de Malortie 
described the reign of Ismail as one of “great projects, great results, and great 
expenditure”96, and in his attempts to gain financial support he made constitutional 
concessions to the rural notables as the rising social power of this period. But the 
European creditors, mainly the British and French, worried of the interests of their 
bondholders, eventually forced Ismail do abdicate in favor of his son Tawfiq, whom 
they hoped it would be easier to control.  Nevertheless, the seeds of political 
participation and constitutionalism were sown, and the whirlwind of political 
turbulences finally led to Egypt’s occupation by the British, as we will also see in the 
following chapter. 
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1.3 Early constitutionalism until 1882 
“Encouragement of the Press, constitutional experiments, and the 
importation of European models in general [?] taught Egyptians for the first 
time the idea of opposition to a ruler.”97 
We here do not have to go into the turbulent details of the Urabi revolt and the 
subsequent British occupation of Egypt in 1882. For us, only the socio-political 
circumstances leading to this turmoil, and the impact these events had on the further 
political and constitutional development of the country, are important. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the rich landowners, represented in the 
Assembly of Deputies, several army officers, and a young generation of intellectuals, 
influenced by liberal political as well as ideas of religious reform preached by Jamal 
al-Afghani, were increasingly demanding a more constitutional form of government.98 
There was no independent press in the country so far, but during the last years of his 
reign, Ismail sponsored some young Christian intellectuals coming mainly from Syria, 
“to counter his detractors both domestic and foreign”99. These men founded e.g. in 
1876 al-Ahram, the oldest still existing newspaper in Egypt. Other journals like Misr 
and the Coptic al-Watan (both 1877), al-Tigara (1878) and Mirat al-Sharq (1879) 
followed, and, though they were not allowed to criticize the government’s policy (the 
first satiric gazette Abu Naddara, founded in 1877, was closed down after only 15 
issues)100, they prepared the ground for a non-official press in the years and decades 
to come and influenced the political discourse in the country. 
The liberal intellectuals in Egypt enjoyed a short period of hope for a new political era 
providing more “shura”, when the young Khedive Tawfiq appointed Sharif Pasha 
prime minister and invited him to draw a new and more liberal constitution. But, 
suspicious of a strengthened Assembly and influenced by the British consul, he soon 
changed his mind and appointed the conservative Riad Pasha new prime minister. 
The critical press was turned down, al-Afghani arrested, and the “Law of Liquidation” 
(1880) strengthened European control over the disposition of Egyptian finances by 
ensuring the larger part of the country’s revenue to the Caisse de la Dette.101 
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Though there existed no real political parties (hizb) then, there were, as mentioned in 
the previous chapter, societies (gam’iya) with their fellow groups, who shared their 
goals of either national independence, loyalty to the Khedive or as sympathizers of 
the army. 102  It was then, however, neither the liberal pashas along with the 
landowning bourgeoisie, nor the young intellectuals, nor declared nationalists (al-hizb 
al-watani) taking the initiative, but the Egyptian officers in the army. The Khedivial 
Decree of 31 July 1880, limiting military service to four years, was intended to retain 
the Turkish-Circassian military elite their privileges by preventing Egyptians from a 
rise to the commissioned grades of the officer corps, and immediately provoked the 
latter’s revolt.103 But the Egyptian officers, represented by Ahmad Urabi, did not trust 
the promises of Tawfiq and his government to reform the army according to their 
wishes, and this brought the landowning notables into the play: They realized their 
chance to gain more influence on the administration and policy of the country by 
uniting with the “Urabists”.104 
Urabi in fact entered the stage of history in summer 1880 just as a rebel fighting for 
the rights of his fellah soldiers, although, in his memoirs, presented himself as a 
fighter for constitutionalism and personal freedom. But, as Schölch has demonstrated, 
public calls for institutional guarantees were not made before 9 September 1881, the 
day, when the Urabists overturned the government of Riad Pasha.105 Thus, the 
demonstration of 9 September at Abdin Palace in Cairo was not a simple “mutiny”, as 
Marsot describes it 106 , and Urabi was at this moment not only acting as a 
“representative of the Egyptian army officers”, as Vatikiotis put it107, but it was the 
result of a conspiracy, planned months before, between the Urabists and the big rural 
landowners. Schölch quotes the memoirs of the renowned reformer of Islam, and 
journalist Shaykh Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), who refers to the alliance 
between the notables and the officers in detail and which shall be presented here for 
it lively illustrates the practice of then backstage politics: 
“The seven months between the affair of Kasr-el-Nil [the rescue of three 
arrested army officers by the Urabists] and the demonstration of September 
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were months of great political activity, which pervaded all classes. Arabi’s 
action gained him much popularity, and put him into communication with the 
civilian members of the National party, such as Sultan Pasha, Suliman 
Abaza, Hassan Sherei, and myself, and it was we who put forward the idea 
of renewing the demand for a Constitution. The point of view from which he 
at that time regarded it was as giving him and his military friends a security 
against reprisals by the Khedive of his Ministers. He told me this repeatedly 
during the summer. We consequently organized petitions for a Constitution, 
and carried on a campaign for it in the press. Arabi saw a great deal of 
Sultan Pasha during the summer, and Sultan, who was very rich, made 
much of him, sending him presents, such as farm produce, horses, and the 
rest, in order to encourage him, and to get his support for the constitutional 
movement. It was in concert with Sultan that the demonstration of Abdin 
was arranged, and it is quite true, that Sultan expected to be named to a 
Ministry after the fall of Riaz. But Sherif Pasha, who became Prime Minister, 
did not think of him and overlooked him. Afterwards Sultan was pacified and 
pleased when he was offered the presidency of the new Chamber of 
Notables.”108 
It is very interesting in this connection that the new Prime Minister Sharif Pasha, in 
his program submitted to the Khedive on 14 September, for the first time defined the 
idea of the separation of powers in an official Egyptian document: in the Arabic text, 
these are defined as the legislative, judiciary and executive power (al-quwa al-
munawwata bi-wad’ al-qawanin wa-l-quwa al-tanfidiya). Three days later, in the 
newspaper Al-Waqa’I al-Misriya, it was stated, that the new government would 
protect with all its strength these “three columns of government”, since veritable 
reforms could only be undertaken on their basis, and the legislative power was 
defined as the “Chamber of the people (maglis al-umma), which is watching over all 
its interests and makes decisions to everyone’s welfare.”109 
The pressure to summon again the Chamber of Deputies (which Sharif Pasha had 
dissolved on 6 July 1879) grew, when on 18 September 1881 the notables submitted 
two petitions to the Minister of the Interior, the second one being “one of the most 
significant constitutionalist documents of the period”, as Schölch calls it. In this 
petition, directed to the Khedive, the notables declare that the order in the world and 
human society can be guaranteed on the basis of freedom and justice alone, which 
can be achieved only by the establishment of a just government, based upon the 
principle of shura (hukuma shuriya adila). They refer to the European parliaments as 
protectors of their peoples (umma) against their governments and appeal to Tawfiq to 
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give the Egyptian people again their Maglis al-Nuwwab, but provide it with the same 
rights as the parliaments in civilized kingdoms. Therefore, Schölch concludes, the 
notables wanted the Chamber to be an instrument to accomplish and guarantee 
justice, freedom as well as material and personal security. Their aim was not a 
“parliamentary government” but an effective representation of their interests and the 
protection of their socio-economic position. Besides, Sharif Pasha’s idea of the 
separation of powers was not mentioned. Tawfiq, whom the Deputies asked to 
convene the Maglis al-Nuwwab for 23 December 1881, assured them he would 
consult the Assembly regarding taxes, the corvee, and Provincial Councils, but not in 
questions of international agreements.110 Sharif Pasha now fetched the “liberal” draft 
constitution of 1879, and the government agreed to it, after some changes and 
appendages, on 31 December 1881. This draft, repeatedly presented as the “first 
constitution of Egypt”111, was not much more than an arbitrary sequence of 49 
articles regulating the election of the delegates of the Assembly, the internal 
organization of the Chamber, its participation in the process of legislation and its 
relation to the Council of Ministers. Like the draft of 1879, the new version, presented 
to the Chamber on 2 January 1882, did not make it a real legislative corporate body, 
and “ministerial responsibility” was nothing more than an empty phrase, as ministers 
could not be prosecuted. Regarding the budget, the Chamber was allowed only to 
give its opinion but had no further authority. The projected “State Council”, which 
should be a kind of Higher Administrative Court and draft laws and decrees, was not 
realized.112 
After Riad had been overturned (due to his resistance against constitutionalism and 
the Assembly) and substituted by Sharif Pasha, Tawfiq, humiliated by the Urabists, 
and in fact opposing any erosion of his power, sought the support both of the Sultan 
and the European Powers against this revolt, which led to the Joint Note of January 
1882 by Britain and France, assuring the Khedive that they supposed him to be “the 
only guarantee of good order and the development of prosperity in Egypt.” 113 
Confronted with the Joint Note, the Deputies demanded the right of control over the 
part of the budget destined for internal expenditures, which Sharif Pasha, the proud 
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Turkish-Circassian Prime Minister, refused: “The Egyptians”, he replied to Wilfrid 
Scaven Blunt, “are children and must be treated like children. I have offered them a 
Constitution, which is good enough for them, and if they are not content with it they 
must do without one. [?] These peasants want guidance.”114  The Assembly of 
Deputies achieved his replacement as Prime Minister by Mahmud Sami al-Barudi (4 
February – 28 May 1882). The new government included, for the first time, several 
Egyptian ministers (Urabi amongst them as Minister of War), according to the slogan 
“Egypt for the Egyptians”. However, the positions of Europeans in the administration 
were untouched. Nevertheless, in order to discredit the Assembly and the new 
government, the news agency Reuter sent message to Europe stating that the 
Chamber was completely under control of the army.115 Moreover, “the British consul, 
the Controller and others, induced the British cabinet to believe the Urabists were 
dangerous revolutionaries who were out to take over government and had to be 
destroyed by military means.”116 
On 7 February 1882, the constitutional law was accepted by the Chamber and, on 
the same day, sanctioned by Khedive Tawfiq. The legislative process was therein 
defined as follows: the Council of Ministers was in charge of introducing bills, the 
Chamber to vote and the Khedive to sanction them. Although the law on the 
Chamber expressed only the delegate’s situational interests and did not exceed the 
principle of shura, its conclusion was, nevertheless, the most significant event in the 
constitutional history of 19th century Egypt.117 In March 1882, a new electoral law for 
the Chamber was decreed, introducing a two-stage electoral system and raising the 
number of Deputies up to 125. Eligible to vote were all off the age of 21 being 
members of the ‘Ulama, Rabbis or Christian clergymen, all teachers, civil servants, 
army officers, lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, engineers and architects, and all men 
paying at least 5,000 P.T. rates or other taxes.118 
Schölch very much corrected the traditional view on the events around the British 
occupation, represented e.g. by Vatikiotis, who wrote that in February 1882, Urabi 
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“sought to bring the Assembly under his control.”119 Though, the revolting Urabists 
had forced Tawfiq to re-open the Assembly, as we have seen, it was the delegates 
using the army’s power to press for a constitution. In fact, after the convention of the 
Assembly, the public interest turned away from the army officers towards the Maglis 
al-Nuwwab, which were shown as the true representatives of the Egyptian people.120 
In the following turbulent months from May to July 1882, the Chamber was not able 
to play an important or at least stabilizing role. The people gathered around Urabi, 
and on 31 May, the Khedive, accompanied by leading members of the Chamber, 
moved to Alexandria, where, two weeks before, an Anglo-French fleet had appeared 
for his protection.121 
However, after the resignation of the government at the end of May, the massacre in 
Alexandria on 11 June and the subsequent bombardment by the British ships exactly 
one month later (11 July), in Cairo, a provisory Assembly of about 250 notables from 
the capital and the provinces confirmed Urabi as the legitimate Minister of War to 
carry on leading the army. Further, he should not obey the Khedive’s commands, for 
Tawfiq had, in their eyes, become a tool in the hands of Egypt’s enemies, and the 
Sultan should decide about his eventual dismissal. All the other affairs of state the 
Maglis al-Urfi should take care of, a group of 29 administrative and military 
bureaucrats, which constituted itself on 3 August 1882 as a kind of substitute or 
emergency government. 122  It is remarkable, that in this “Egyptian government”, 
Turkish-Circassians worked harmoniously together with Muslim and Coptic Egyptians. 
The importance of the Maglis al-Urfi grew as well as its self-image, and from 3 
August on it claimed not only the civil but also the highest military authority (although 
Urabi still was ra’is al-gais, or highest military commander). The “head” of this 
government was Ya’qub Sami, though the way of governing was collegially, meaning 
that decisions were not taken by the majority but by concord. The Maglis al-Urfi held 
its meetings almost every day and in fact governed the country until the capitulation 
after the battle of Tell el-Kebir on 13 September 1882.123 This government was not at 
all political or social-revolutionary, for it promoted a rather religious-patriotic 
resistance against the foreign invasion and referred to the Sultan as its highest 
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authority – “What the revolution was really about was that a new Egyptian 
bureaucracy, landowners, professionals and army officers wished to replace in power 
and influence an older Turco-Egyptian aristocracy.”124 
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2. Constitutionalism, judiciary and political movements 
under British occupation 
2.1 Constitutionalism and judiciary after the occupation 
“These latter [the Egyptians] have, for centuries past, been a subject race. 
[?] Neither, for the present, do they appear to possess the qualities which 
would render it desirable, either in their own interests, or in those of the 
civilized world in general, to raise them at a bound to the category of 
autonomous rulers with full rights of internal sovereignty.”125 
Lord Dufferin, then British ambassador to the Sublime Port, was commissioned to re-
organize administration in Egypt.126 First, he “prevailed on the Khedive to abrogate 
the Fundamental Law.”127 Dufferin’s “Organic Law” of 1 May 1883, also proclaimed 
through the Khedive, reorganized the whole constitutional framework of the country 
by creating “two semi-parliamentary institutions, a Legislative Council and a General 
Assembly”128 – in fact a puppet parliament with no powers and controlled by the 
British “to supervise reforms that were deemed necessary for the well-being of the 
country and to make sure the bondholders continued to be paid.”129 Reforms, as 
already the “astute Lord Dufferin” (Vatikiotis) realized, which “could not be effected 
unless the British occupation was prolonged indefinitely”.130 And though e.g. the 
liberal governments in London, headed by Prime Minister Gladstone, seriously 
wished at least within the next ten years the evacuation of British troops, it became 
increasingly difficult to leave Egypt or, as Deighton put it, “It was to prove much 
easier to go into Egypt than to get out of it.”131Thus, a historical contradiction, 
“namely, the myth of the temporary nature of the British occupation of Egypt”132, had 
been born. 
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The newly created “Legislative Council” (Maglis shura al-Qawanin) consisted of thirty 
members (sixteen elected by prominent landowners, and fourteen chosen by the 
Khedive) and had, in principle, the power “to examine the budget, review legislation, 
and hold ministers to account. In practice, it served only an advisory role and had 
little impact on legislation.”133  Thus, it could not take over initiative by making 
legislative proposals, and the government could reject its decrees.134 
Besides this Legislative Council and the Provincial Councils, Dufferin’s 
“Organizational Law” created a new “General Assembly” (Al-Jamiyya al-umumiyya). 
Yet, on the local level, the Provincial Councils with their very limited consultative 
power and subordination to the central administration could not deceive, that, “the 
British occupation did away with the large autonomy which rural notables had 
enjoyed in time of Ismail.”135 The General Assembly was composed of 82 members 
made up of six ministers, the 30 members of the Legislative Council, and 46 
delegates elected by landholders for six years.136 Its head was the President of the 
Legislative Assembly, who was appointed by the Khedive, and its candidates had to 
be older than 30, literate, and pay at least £ 50,00 annual tax.137 The General 
Assembly met only every other year and had little impact on policy.138 However, new 
direct taxes could not be imposed without its approval, and it also had to be 
“consulted” on many other subjects. In 1913, it was merged with the Legislative 
Council into the so-called “Legislative Assembly” and its powers were considerably 
increased (e.g. it was empowered to question ministers and to veto the raise of direct 
taxes, and besides its 66 elected members, the 17 appointed deputies represented 
the interests of minorities139), but only two years later, when Britain declared martial 
law, it was suspended. However, within its short existence, “it provided vital 
experience in public debate for advocates of liberalism [and thus laid the] foundation 
for the constitutionalist movement that emerged after World War I.”140 
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Evelyn Baring, 1st Earl of Cromer, the former British Controller-General and then 
appointed the first Consul-General in Egypt (September 1883 – May 1907), “stated 
candidly, that neither of these bodies was intended to create representative 
government in Egypt. Their goal was to ‘give the Egyptian people an opportunity of 
making their voice heard, but at the same time not to bind the Executive government 
by parliamentary fetters, which would have been out of place in a country whose 
political education was so little advanced as that of Egypt.’”141 The character of this 
British “Veiled Protectorate” is properly illustrated in the following quotation: 
“The ministers were inclined to respect the opinions of the Legislative 
Council when the British allowed them to do so ? for all the Ministries a 
British Under-Secretary of Adviser exercised effective control and 
operated under the general directions of the British Consul-General. Their 
plans were imposed through the Khedive and the Ministers who, in 
accordance with Lord Granville’s instruction, either obeyed or ceased to 
hold office.”142 
Al-Sayyid Marsot brings it to the point by stating, that the British “were to rule from 
behind a façade of Egyptian ministers who had little authority, and were rubber 
stamps for their British manipulators.”143 This system, which held executive authority 
in Egyptian hands, organized in government departments and ministries, but left 
political control exclusively in British hands144, worked for both Tawfiq and the pashas, 
and the latter, “fearful of losing their possessions and suffering the Khedive’s 
vengeance” 145 , appealed to Cromer, who, in exchange for their cooperation, 
protected them. 
Nevertheless, the British also initiated important juridical modifications, which helped 
to eventually develop a more liberal form of government in Egypt after the First World 
War.146 For instance, the establishment of the National Courts in 1883, by extending 
the codes and procedures of the “Mixed Courts” of 1876 to the entire Egyptian 
judicial system, strengthened equality before the law and before the courts.147 From 
then on, the National and Mixed Courts applied a codified law, in which Western 
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influence greatly predominated. Moreover, these courts “were staffed by lawyers 
trained in the modern way, who came to constitute one of the most influential, liberal, 
and progressive elements in the population.”148 On the other hand, there still existed 
the Sharia courts and the courts of the non-Muslim communities, using non-codified 
law, but both were strictly confined to matters of family law.149 Until 1890, French 
inspired legal codes were dominant in Egypt, following the influence of French law in 
the Ottoman Empire, but after a series of corruption scandals and a rise in the crime 
rate, Cromer, who had always regarded French law as ill-suited for the backward 
state of Egypt, initiated the integration of the Anglo-Indian procedural code into the 
Egyptian legal system.150 An Englishman, Sir John Scott, was therefor appointed as 
advisor to the Ministry of Justice, and English judges were appointed to the National 
Courts.151  The British also founded a Committee of Judicial Surveillance, which 
consisted of three senior European judges, appointed to supervise the operation of 
the whole judicial system. Besides, and in contrast to India, local notables were still 
allowed to apply traditional law and to serve as magistrates. Finally, the occupation 
power established several training schools for lawyers and judges and restructured 
the Egyptian Law School. An Egyptian College of Law was established in 1886, and, 
due to the long-standing ties of the Egyptian legal profession to French legal and 
political thinking, a French School of Law was created in 1890.152 Many of these 
lawyers should also become most prominent in the national movement, which will be 
described in the next chapter. 
 
2.2 The first Nationalist parties until independence 
"If I weren't an Egyptian, I would have wished to be an Egyptian."153 
The first political party in Egypt was called “National Constitutionalist Party” (al-Hizb 
al-Watani al Dustury)154 and founded on 2 April 1879 by military officers as a secret 
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society. The extreme nationalist wing of this party split only seven months later and 
formed the “National Party of Egypt” (al-Hizb al-Watani al-Misri)  on 4 November 
1879 under the leadership of Ahmad Urabi.155 The Urabi revolt, however, was rather 
a religious-patriotic reaction to foreign, predominantly British, influence and control 
over Egypt’s government, than a real national movement (e.g. it did not doubt the 
supreme authority of the Ottoman Sultan). However, the two parties founded in 1879 
both demanded an administrative reform, an “Egyptianization” of the state apparatus 
and a constitution, the National Party of Egypt also an education reform, a finance 
plan, enhancement of the armed forces, and “resistance against foreign 
intervention”.156 
After the suppression of the “Society for Revenge” in 1883, a terrorist organization 
aiming to drive out the British and assassinate those Egyptians who had betrayed the 
Urabi revolt (one of its members was the later famous Saad Zaghlul)157, there was no 
serious political manifestation against the occupying power for one decade.158 Maybe 
“many Egyptians believed British promises of their intention to ‘rescue and retire’, 
and waited to see democratic institutions set up”159, as Al-Sayyid Marsot put it. But 
Cromer, besides considering that “subject races” did not really want or need self-
government, was in any case deeply convinced that they were totally incapable of it. 
Instead he pursued “a ‘full belly’ policy which fed the population, kept it quiescent and 
allowed the elite to make money and so cooperate with the occupying power.”160 As 
long as the weak and obedient Tawfiq was ruling, this policy worked. The Khedive 
also time and again countered the inimical press by launching his own newspapers. 
But Egyptian journalists and authors like Adib Ishaq (1856-85), who, though a loyal 
“Ottomanist”, in his essays on freedom and the rights and duties of citizens shows to 
be strongly influenced by his readings about the French Revolution, or Al-Naqqash, 
who is usually credited with coining the expression “Egypt for the Egyptians”, 
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contributed to intensify an Egyptian self-confidence.161 On the one hand, newspapers 
and magazines published by Christian Syrian emigrants stood for progressive reform 
ideas, “which could serve as the basis for a secular national independence 
movement”162, but were also associated with foreign, moreover Christian, interests 
(e.g. al-Muqattam favored cooperation with the British authorities, whereas al-Ahram 
was suspected of advancing French interests). On the other hand, the conservative 
Muslim press was represented by the daily al-Mu’ayyad, edited by Shaykh Ali Yusuf 
(1863-1913), which was, since 1890 and until Mustafa Kamil, from 1900 to 1907, 
published his al-Liwa (The Standard), the major platform for nationalist writers.163 
The turning point for the nationalist movement came when Tawfiq’s eldest son, 
Abbas II, succeeded his father as Khedive in 1892. Unlike Tawfiq, Abbas sought to 
get rid of British paternalism, and therefor not only looked both to the Sultan and to 
France as possible allies, but also supported the Islamic nationalists of Shaykh Ali 
Yusuf as well as young and patriotic law student Mustafa Kamil (1874-1908). In his 
memoirs, dictated to his secretary about 25 years after he had been exiled from 
Egypt in 1914, Khedive Abbas Hilmi II sought to justify, why he had supported both 
groups around Shaykh Ali Yusuf and Mustafa Kamil at different times: 
“The concept of nationhood had a different meaning for each of these two 
groups and could clearly not be realized in an identical form and at the same 
time! I soon came to the conclusion that it was impossible to unite them. It 
was necessary to act first with one and then with the other; that is what led 
people to say that I played a double game. On the contrary, it meant that I 
could avoid a clash between these two rival forces by carefully limiting 
dissension between them and so forestall the turmoil that could result from 
such a clash. I especially did not want, by possible preference, to cause 
jealousy that would set one party against the other. I preferred the moderates, 
but I understood the extremists. However, I did not make use of either one or 
the other. Since they both disapproved of the principle of total English 
occupation, I was wholeheartedly with both of them.”164 
Latif Salim, a former Urabist, had founded a secret society called the Nationalist 
Party. When Kamil, who had continued his studies in France, returned to Egypt, he 
soon took over the leadership of this new organization. He had a devoted following 
among students and “labored to show that Egyptians did form a nation, one which 
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demanded independence from foreign tutelage, and a constitutional government of 
Egyptians ruling for the benefit of Egyptians.”165 After Kamil had finished his law 
study in Toulouse, he went home to Egypt in November 1894, and on his journey 
made the acquaintance of Colonel Baring, brother of the British Consul-General Lord 
Cromer, who asserted that it was not the intention of Britain to ever leave Egypt. 
Back in Cairo, Kamil Mustafa published this conversation in al-Ahram, which caused 
a huge controversy in Egyptian political circles. Soon thereafter, Kamil, together with 
the Khedive, created the secret “Society for the Revival of the Nation” (al-Jam’iyya li-
Ihya al-Watan).166 In May 1895, Abbas II again sent Kamil to France to carry out a 
press campaign, which was intended to swing European public opinion against the 
British occupation.167 Besides France he also visited Vienna (where Abbas, then 
Crown Prince, had had been educated at the famous Theresian Academy), but the 
campaign failed, although Kamil, by the support of the famous writer Juliette Adam, 
gained access to leading French writers and newspapers.168 He returned to Egypt in 
January 1886. And though, in the following years, several incidents between British 
soldiers and native Egyptians, like the one in Aqaba (1906) or another in Dinshawai 
(1907), aided nationalist sentiments in Egypt itself, and on further travels to Europe, 
Kamil “assured his European audience that the Egyptians were eager to absorb the 
fundamentals of Western civilization [and] disclaimed any xenophobic or anti-
Christian feeling”169, French interest in the “Egyptian Question” declined, particularly 
due to the Entente Cordiale (1904) between Britain and France, which tempered their 
colonial concurrence. 
Besides, the conflict between Kamil and Shaykh Ali Yusuf on the nationalist 
leadership170, the continuous distrust of Kamil towards the Khedive, culminating in 
their temporary discord after Abbas’ visit to London in 1900, Cromer’s strategy of 
“divide [the nationalist movement] et impera”, and finally, the succession of Cromer 
by the more conciliatory Eldon Gorst in 1907, weakened the nationalist cause before 
the First World War. Already in 1906, Abbas II, in a secret meeting with Mustafa 
Kamil and other leading personalities of the Nationalist Party, decided to make the 
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latter an open movement.171 In its program the party demanded the same stipulations 
like the National Party of Egypt in 1879 (mentioned above), and it was, like the 
former, open to both Muslims and Christians, but it also claimed the abolishment of 
the Mixed Courts and the retreat of all foreign troops. However, Lord Cromer sought 
to weaken the party by supporting the formation of other, moderate parties.172 
In the same year of the formation of the Nationalist Party, it lost its unique position as 
the only nationalist party, when the moderate Umma (People’s Party) was founded in 
September (and dissolved already eight years later, in 1914), consisting of wealthy 
notables, government officials, and young intellectuals, which opted for cooperation 
with the British. At the end of 1907, the Palace initiated the founding of the 
Constitutional Reform Party (which, however, neither formulated an ideology nor won 
a mass following).173 The Revolution of the Young Turks in the following year (24 July 
1908), resulting in the abdication of Sultan Abdulhamid, was something Khedive 
Abbas Hilmi II did consider neither possible nor necessary in his realm, for Egypt, as 
he understood it, had transformed and restored its prosperity already a long time 
before. Furthermore, as he wrote in his memoirs, “Egyptians understood that if 
Turkey had been able to establish an Ottoman (and therefore national) Parliament 
without too much trouble, they themselves would establish one only with enormous 
difficulties, and in the distant future.”174 
Also in 1908, Mustafa Kamil died unexpectedly, and his successor in leading the 
Nationalist Party, Muhammad Farid, contributed in the fractionation of the party e.g. 
by his controversial decision to increase the mass appeal of the party newspaper al-
Liwa by appointing the pan-Islamist Shaykh Abd al-Aziz Jawish as its new editor.175 
Farid even had to flee to Europe in 1912, due to prosecution in Egypt for criticizing 
the government. The Khedive’s judgment on him reveals not only Abbas Hilmi’s 
opinion about Farid but also part of his own understanding of politics: “Muhammad 
Farid did not realize that even in opposition, it is necessary to know how to maintain 
a certain degree of tact, and for opposition to be effective, it must be based on 
something. He had had the pretension to lead the movement without having the 
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necessary discernment; he consulted no one and disclaimed all obligations towards 
the Throne. He had forgotten that, without the Palace, the task of his predecessor 
would have been unproductive, that Mustafa Kamel had drawn part of his strength 
from the encouragement of his Prince. Kamel found in his Prince the buttress for his 
talent, his faith and his popularity.”176 
Though particularly the Nationalist Party had contributed to the development of a 
nationalist self-confidence of Egyptians, and, since Mustafa Kamil, strikes and 
demonstrations “became a constant feature of Egyptian national life from that time to 
this day”177 , the party itself was not truly a national party, since its members 
represented mainly the small, Muslim, urban middle class. Moreover, the major 
decisions were not made by majority vote of the general assembly, but by the 
president and only a small clique of advisers in secret meetings.178 This kind of 
decision-making should become a typical feature for Egyptian parties until the early 
21st century, and should not only distinguish them from Western parliamentary 
parties but also prevent that the consciousness for real parliamentary democracy in 
Egypt could strike roots in the mass of the people. Writing about Mustafa Kamil’s 
legacy as a party leader, Khedive Abbas Hilmi II also reveals his elitist outlook on 
modernity and relations between state and society: “He had founded newspapers to 
disseminate his thoughts and ideas to the masses, but he had not thought about the 
practical organization of his party or of creating a solid framework for it. His personal 
magnetism and dynamism had always taken precedence over reasoning and method. 
That was why the captivated crowds were more attached to his person than to his 
ideas. The Oriental has this trait, that he follows a man more readily than a principle. 
It is a recurrent theme in history. Institutions have, in the history of the Egyptian 
people, played a completely secondary role.”179 
Besides the Nationalist Party, whose radicals were presumably inspired by French 
ideas of liberty180, and the Umma Party of the lawyer Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, founded 
in 1907, also in opposition to the occupation, but nevertheless affected by British 
ideas of individual freedom and utilitarianism and advocating “co-operation with the 
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British in the gradual implementation of reform, particularly in education”181, five other 
moderate political parties were formed in Egypt before World War I: first there was 
the Constitutional Reform Party (1907), led by Shaykh Ali Yusuf until 1913, and later 
by Shaykh Rashid Rida. Both were Muslim pseudo-liberals, pursuing a nationalist 
interpretation of Egypt’s Islamic identity. Then there was the National Free Party, the 
Party of Independent Egyptians, the Young Egyptian Party, and finally the Party of 
Nobles. However, the latter were all minor parties and had no real influence on the 
course of events during these years.182 
The problems of all parties were not only their time and again changing relations to 
and publically declared opinions about the Khedive, the Sultan, and the British, who 
were themselves linked by varying alliances, but also their repeated internal 
fractionation and the rivalries among their leading figures. Consul-General Eldon 
Gorst, for instance, by his much more conciliatory policy towards Egyptians, was able 
to separate the Khedive from the extreme nationalists and turn him against the 
Nationalist Party. He intended to give Egyptians greater responsibility in 
administering their country by expanding the authority of the Egyptian council of 
ministers, and, respectively, limit that of British advisers. Thus, he promulgated by 
law new Provincial Councils in June 1909. 
As mentioned already in the previous chapter, Gorst’s successor, Herbert Kitchener 
(1911-14), by his Organic Law from 1913, merged the former Legislative Council and 
the General Assembly, established by the Organizational Law of 1883, into the 
“Legislative Assembly”, which should be in permanent session every year, from mid-
November until the end of May (before that it had met every other month). Moreover, 
members of the Legislative Council were now encouraged to question ministers on 
all matters of public policy.183 Besides, the Legislative Assembly now consisted to a 
higher proportion of elected than nominated members (66:17). 
On the whole, and compared to the situation before, the new Assembly was “a 
modest and cautious advance in the direction of a more democratic system of 
government.”184 Kitchener’s strategy was to humiliate the “wicked little Khedive” and 
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to force his abdication185, which should be accomplished at the beginning of the War. 
Due to the Ottoman alliance with Germany, the British wanted to separate Egypt from 
the Ottoman Empire, which they did on 18 December 1914 by the declaration of 
Egypt as a protectorate. Simultaneously, they deposed Khedive Abbas and replaced 
him by his uncle Hussein Kamil who was entitled “Sultan” in order to demonstrate the 
separation from the Ottoman Empire (besides, the personal resentment between 
Kitchener and Abbas Hilmi played a significant role in this decision). The Legislative 
Assembly was suspended and martial law proclaimed, which led to more 
suppression both of the nationalist movement and the anti-British press.186 
However, although the Legislative Assembly was suspended after such a short life, 
the leaders of the 1919 independence movement emerged out of it, amongst them 
the most influential and illustrious political personality of the years to come, until his 
death in 1927: Saad Zaghlul. After the elections to the Legislative Assembly in 
December 1913, “both the Umma and the National Party had supported Zaghlul.”187 
Both parties recognized the former journalist, judge in the Court of Appeals (1892), 
Minister of Education (1906) and Minister of Justice (1910), as the leader of 
opposition in the Legislative Assembly. Zaghlul was, for sure, one of the most 
prominent examples for the “rising generation of lawyers and writers in the 
Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly from 1883 to 1913.”188 
Lawyers and judges like Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, since March 1907 editor of the newly 
founded newspaper al-Jarida, and leading spokesman of the Umma Party, were the 
advocates both of liberalism and nationalism at the beginning of the 20th century. 
Rutherford remarks, that, around 1900, “the legal profession had become a center of 
liberal discourse and culture within the elite”189, and Anderson, besides many others, 
calls it “noteworthy that the nationalist cause was largely led by lawyers.”190 One of 
these lawyers, Qasim Amin (1865-1908), was even a pioneer of female emancipation 
and caused a controversial discourse in intellectual circles after the publication of his 
book Tahrir al-Mar’a (“The Emancipation of Women”) in 1899 and the subsequent 
volume Al Mar’a al-Jadida (“The New Woman”), providing not only intellectual 
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arguments for the emancipation of women, but for the advantages of westernization 
in general.191 
In the meantime, the War had interrupted the development of political institutions, but 
the nationalists had never stopped their constitutional demands. Nevertheless, a year 
after the death of Sultan Kamil and the succession of his brother Fu’ad (October 
1917), the British authorities decreed a new constitution in November 1918, which 
“entirely ignored the existence of the national sentiment which the war had stimulated 
[?] it proposed the creation of a new legislature in whose upper chamber, the senate, 
not only British Advisers, and Egyptian ministers were to have seats, but also 
representatives of the large foreign communities, chosen by electorates, to voice 
their commercial, financial, and professional interests [?] The opinion of the senate 
were to prevail in all matters of essential policy [?] clearly with a view to secure the 
passage of whatever the British government might consider necessary for the 
maintenance of their controlling authority.”192 
Three delegates of the Legislative Assembly protested against this constitution by 
constituting themselves into a Wafd (“Delegation”). On 13 November 1918 they “met 
with Sir Reginald Wingate, the British High-Commissioner, to request they be allowed 
to proceed to the Paris Peace Conference and present Egypt’s case.”193 These three 
delegates were Saad Zaghlul, the new leader of the national movement, Ali Sha’rawi, 
and Abd al-Aziz Fahmi. They acted in full agreement with Prime Minister Rushdi 
Pasha, for they had, at that time, the support of Sultan Fu’ad I, whose different 
motives were, however, “deriving from his autocratic tendencies.”194 When the British 
authorities kept the Wafd, as any other delegation, from going to London or Paris, 
nationalist protests followed, leading to the declaration of martial law and the arrest 
and deportation of Zaghlul and two other Wafd members to Malta (8 March 1919).195 
The result was “an explosion of violence in all regions in support of the national 
leader”196, demonstrations by students and other intellectuals in Cairo, Alexandria 
and other major cities, as well as “massive strikes by transport workers, judges and 
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lawyers.”197 Some of the rural areas even broke away from the central government, 
using the revolution as an excuse to “re-establish village unity by creating their own 
rural republic.”198 
In the meantime, Britain had been informed at the Peace Conference, that the Allies 
would recognize the British Protectorate over Egypt. Therefore General Allenby, 
Wingate’s successor as High Commissioner, released Zaghlul and his fellows on 7 
April. But when the Wafd arrived in Paris shortly later, they were not only denied a 
hearing, but also “shocked at the recognition of the protectorate by President Wilson 
and several powers”199, contradicting Wilson’s own Fourteen Points speech (in the 
fifth point of this speech, regarding colonial claims, Wilson had spoken in favor of the 
interests of the populations concerned, which “must have equal weight with the 
equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.) 200  These 
difficulties and the British refusal to accept “complete independence” of Egypt, led to 
major differences within the Wafd and eventually to a split between the hardliner 
Zaghlul, and his delegate colleague Adli Yeken, Adli was more willing to compromise 
and enjoyed the support of Sultan Fu’ad, who had appointed him Prime Minister in 
March 1921. In the end, the leading Adlists succeeded, with Lord Allenby’s support. 
On 28 February 1922, Britain unilaterally declared Egypt an independent state, the 
protectorate abolished, and martial law removed, though four points were reserved to 
the discretion of the British government, making the independence well-nigh void: the 
security of British communications in Egypt, defense, the protection of foreigners, 
and the Sudan.201 In order to support the new policy, Adli and his supporters, 250 
lawyers and great landowners, mainly former members of the dissolved Umma Party, 
felt the need to found a political party, and on 30 October 1922, the Liberal 
Constitutionalist Party was formed. Besides independence, its program contained 
also demands for social, educational and economic reforms.202 
However, “Practically none of these parties was organized along European lines ? 
these parties were chiefly based upon personal attachments to the leaders, and the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
197 Vatikiotis, History of Egypt, 264. 
198 Al-Sayyid Marsot, A History of Egypt, 96. 
199 Zayid, The Origins of the Liberal Constitutionalist Party, 342. 
200 Fourteen Points Speech by US-President Woodrow Wilson, accessed 22 July 
2012, http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Fourteen_Points_Speech. 
201 Zayid, The Origins of the Liberal Constitutionalist Party, 343. 
202 El-Ghannam, Das Regierungssystem des unabhängigen Ägypten, 63. 
?44 
leadership itself was often merely the cloak of private ambition ? The published 
programmes of all these parties show an amazing resemblance to one another; save 
for education?”203 Besides, a liberal experiment was about to be tried in Egypt, 
which should grant the country “a constitutional form of government, to institute 
representation and political parties, freedom of speech, the right to opposition”204 – a 
liberal experiment, which, eventually should fail, causing dramatic consequences 
until the early 21st century. 
 
2.3 Liberalism versus political radicalization 
“[?] remember, what Mustafa al-Nahas did, when he took over the 
leadership of the Wafd Party in 1927. At the time he was a big well-known 
lawyer, but as soon as he became party leader he withdrew from legal 
practice, closed his office and made his famous remark: ‘Today I have 
become an advocate for the whole nation, so I can no longer defend 
individuals in court.’”205 
Following the British unilateral declaration of Egyptian independence on 28 February 
1922, the British, as George Lloyd, 1st Baron Lloyd and High Commissioner to Egypt 
(1925-29) mentioned later, “’forced’ the parliamentary régime upon the country ‘in the 
face of the king’s wishes’.”206  A Commission to draft the final constitution was 
appointed by the government and therefore not accepted both by the Nationalist 
Party and the Wafd, who argued, “that only an elected constituent assembly 
representing the nation could legitimately draft the fundamental law of the land.”207 
On the other hand, the king was not willing to accept a constitution “that would limit 
his authority or would even have strong powers of enforcement.”208 This constituent 
“Commission of Thirty”, consisting of 30 influential persons, mainly lawyers and high-
ranking officials, but also e.g. the head of the Sufi orders, an ex-Mufti of Egypt, five 
Copts, one Jew, as well as representatives of commerce and of the Bedouins, 
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seemed to be well-balanced in affording representation to different interests and 
sections, and was ably assisted by legal experts.209 
Nevertheless, it had a difficult job, for it had to balance the interests of Fu’ad and the 
British with the attempt to limit the power of the king and create a more or less form 
of constitutional monarchy, leaving legislative power to elected institutions. 
Furthermore, there was conflict about the king’s designated title “King of Egypt and 
the Sudan”, which jeopardized the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium of the Sudan (1899-
1956). Though Prime Minister Sarwat and his followers “may have disliked this 
provision, they had no means of opposing it without giving the king and Zaghlul a 
powerful pretext for attacking them as creatures of the British government.”210 Yet, 
“the draft constitution, however solicitous of the king’s prerogative, represented a 
serious limitation of his powers.”211 In the course of the constitutional struggle, not 
only Sarwat resigned from office (November 1922), but also his successor Tawfiq 
Nasim (March 1923). The final version was “a defective constitution”212, but the only 
possible compromise between the wishes of the king, British interests, the 
Commission’s liberal stipulations and the nationalist’s demands. The intrigues and 
animosities respectively temporary strategic alliances between former enemies (like 
the king and Saad Zaghlul on the Sudan) before the enacting of the constitution were 
just a foretaste of the political controversies in the next three decades. 
However, the constitution was promulgated on 19 April 1923. “Although, like the 
Ottoman Constitution of 1876, it owed much to the Belgian model of 1831, it 
appeared to follow more closely the Ottoman model in its authoritarian provisions. 
Thus, it gave extensive powers to the monarchy which tended to undermine the 
authority of parliament and cabinet.” 213 The “King of Egypt and the Sudan” was not 
only head of state (art. 33), but also of the executive (art. 48), and he exercised 
legislative jointly with a bicameral parliament (art. 24). The king was not responsible 
to any person or institution (art. 33) and had the right to suspend or dissolve 
parliament (art. 38 and 39). He appointed the prime minister, who chose his cabinet, 
which again had to be confirmed and also could be dismissed by the king (art. 49). In 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
209 Kedourie, “The Genesis of the Egyptian Constitution of 1923,” 351-352. 
210 Kedourie, “The Genesis of the Egyptian Constitution of 1923,” 355-356. 
211 Kedourie, “The Genesis of the Egyptian Constitution of 1923,” 356. 
212 Al-Sayyid Marsot, A History of Egypt, 98. 
213 Vatikiotis, History of Egypt, 276. 
?46 
non-session periods of parliament and in the state of an emergency, royal decrees 
were to be enacted (though, according to art. 60, they had to be signed by the 
president of parliament and the prime minister). The cabinet as a whole and each 
single minister were responsible to parliament (art. 61), which, on its part, could 
overthrow the cabinet by a no-confidence vote (art. 65). Parliament consisted of the 
Senate and the Lower House (art. 73). The Senate, which had mainly the power to 
revise laws promulgated by the Lower House (art. 28), consisted of 147 members, 
two-fifth of which were appointed by the king (art. 74); the rest was elected directly 
and for ten years (art. 79) out of all male Egyptians with an minimum annual income 
of 1,500 Egyptian Pounds respectively an annual tax rate of 150 Egyptian Pounds 
(art. 78). The king also appointed the president of the Senate (art. 80). The Lower 
House, on the one hand, had fiscal sovereignty and budgetary control, and, on the 
other hand, fixed public tariffs and wages (art. 137).214 It consisted of 260 delegates, 
to be elected every five years (art. 86) on the basis of universal manhood suffrage.215 
It should also me mentioned, that the constitution “guaranteed freedom of expression 
and assembly, and asserted the equality of all citizens before the law, regardless of 
race, language, or religion (articles 3, 14, 20, 21).”216 On the local level, the principle 
of representation by Provincial Councils was embodied in the constitution, thus laying 
down the basis of a modern system of local government. Article 133 stipulated that, 
“provincial and municipal councils were to be elected bodies and local policies 
formulated and executed after prior approval by the central authorities.”217 
Elections were held in January 1924, resulting in an overwhelming victory for the 
Wafd under Saad Zaghlul, who formed the first Wafd government on 28 January.218 
Actually, the balance of political power in the country was quite fragile: “Zaghlul – 
who was dubbed ‘the king of hearts’, as opposed to the real king sitting in the palace 
at Abdin, and the uncrowned king, the British High Commissioner, sitting in his 
palace at Qasr al-Doubara – had to toe a fine line in that tripartite power setting.”219 
The Wafd was indeed the preeminent political force in Egypt until the early 1950s, 
gaining overwhelming victories, whenever free elections were held. But especially in 
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the 1920s and in the early 1930s, being a Wafdist was merely a synonym for being a 
nationalist, or, as the brilliant Naguib Mahfouz put it bluntly in one of his novels, “At 
the same time the whole country was [Wafdist].”220 The party was based both in the 
rural middle-class and in high-status urban groups, the so-called effendiyya, meaning 
modern educated university students, teachers, lawyers, journalists, government-
functionaries and other professionals.221 Beinin and Lockman characterize it “as a 
bourgeois nationalist party, representing most directly the interests of the urban and 
rural middle class: the owners of medium-sized agricultural properties and the urban 
effendiyya.”222 
Ideologically the Wafd was bourgeois-democratic, in matters of church-state relations 
it stood for secularism, and it was always in opposition to the king and his allies.223 
But foremost, it united the overwhelming majority of Egyptians from all classes, 
geographical areas and both Muslims and Copts, behind its banner by almost 
monopolizing the national issue and demanding complete independence from Britain, 
unification with the Sudan (which was jointly administered with the British in the 
Anglo-Egyptian Condominium since 1899) and the withdrawal of British troops.224 But 
thereby, the party neglected the social issue and, ensuring “the continual reelection 
of the faithful umda”225, it avoided the issue of land reform thus continuing social 
disparity throughout the country. Additionally, Saad Zaghlul’s authoritarian style both 
inside his own party and in the Lower House was not helpful for developing real 
parliamentarianism and a democratic consciousness throughout the majority of the 
population, aside a small group of intellectuals and leftists in the country. Within the 
Wafd, he brooked no differences of opinion. And in the House, which he ruled with an 
iron fist, there was also no opposition to speak of. He answered attacks of the 
opposition press by applying the sanctions of the harsh 1881 Press Law against 
newspapers and magazines, which was “disastrous for the Egyptian experiment in 
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constitutional government.”226 Moreover, he “introduced a system of patronage into 
political life, and a system of violence and of public demonstrations as a weapon 
against the opposition.”227 Apart from the continuous struggle with the king to rule 
according to the constitution, to secure “the distribution and separation of powers and 
prerogatives, the Wafdist concept of power, of politics and government was 
essentially inimical to the healthy development of parliamentary life and rule.”228 But 
although the Wafd did not have a “European” party structure, it was the only well 
organized party in Egypt and even established and supported organizations, that 
“dealt with women’s, student’s and worker’s issues.”229 
However, after only ten months in office, Zaghlul was forced to resign after having 
been indirectly blamed for the assassination of the British commander-in-chief of the 
Egyptian army, Sir Lee Stack, on 19 November 1924. High Commissioner Allenby 
was convinced, that Zaghlul’s fiery speeches had incited violence. Although the 
prime minister had nothing to do with Stack’s murder (it was committed, unbeknown 
to Zaghlul, by a paramilitary arm of the Wafd), Allenby presented the government 
with an ultimatum, demanding not only an indemnity of half a million pounds but also 
the withdrawal of all Egyptian army units from the Sudan. Zaghlul signed the 
indemnity check, but refused all the other stipulations of the ultimatum, and resigned 
on 23 November.230 
King Fu’ad took the opportunity for a first stroke against constitutional rule by 
appointing a new government under his ally Ahmad Ziwar Pasha, first President of 
the Senate, which accepted and implemented the British ultimatum unconditionally. 
One of the few positive outcomes of the first Wafd government had been a new 
electoral law in July 1924, allowing direct elections. Now, the king, by decree, 
postponed the parliamentary session for one month and then dissolved the House, 
which was again calamitous for democratic development. Besides, and to make 
“another Wafd electoral victories more difficult, the indirect two-stage election 
process was reinstated.”231The confidence in political parties was further weakened 
by the emergence of splits inside the Wafd after Zaghlul’s death in 1927. His legacy 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
226 Vatikiotis, History of Egypt, 279. 
227 Al-Sayyid Marsot, A History of Egypt, 102. 
228 Vatikiotis, History of Egypt, 280. 
229 Botman, Egypt from Independence to Revolution, 59. 
230 Al-Sayyid Marsot, A History of Egypt, 100-101. 
231 Vatikiotis, History of Egypt, 281. 
? 49 
to Egyptian politics was for sure an authoritarian style in and “absolutist control over 
party politics”232, and therefor “had sown many of the public ills that have beset 
political life to the present day.”233 
His successor as party leader, Mustafa al-Nahas, was a respected lawyer, but also a 
bulldog and demagogue, and in the following years many Wafdists left the party and 
formed splinter parties, which, however, had little influence both in parliament and in 
the population. As mentioned in the previous chapter, already in 1922 the Liberal 
Constitutionalist Party had been formed under Adli Yeken. Politics in the following 
thirty years were characterized by personal animosities and jealousies, which 
became more important than principles and the country’s common interest234 and 
thus undermined the people’s confidence in the democratic system. 
In the meantime, the king had initiated another royal coup against parliamentary life: 
After the formation of a government in alliance with the pro-Palace Ittihad in June 
1928, Fu’ad postponed parliamentary session for one month, “and on 19 July 
dissolved Parliament and postponed election for three years”235, during which, of 
course, Egypt ought to be governed by royal decree. In 1930, Prime Minister Ismail 
Sidqi, one of Egypt’s most ambitious politicians, formed the conservative People’s 
Party (Hizb al-Shaab), which was actually more a clique around its founder than a 
political party, “set up to support Sidqi’s own political aspirations and to undermine 
the interests of the Unity and Wafd parties.”236 
On 22 October 1930, Sidqi abolished the constitution of 1923 and drafted not only a 
new one but also promulgated a new electoral law, thereby on the one hand 
strengthening the powers of the monarch, and on the other hand minimizing the 
chances of overwhelming Wafdist victories in elections.237  Albeit, there were no 
elections, for parliament had been suspended in July 1930 and should be so until 
May 1936,238 thus making the Sidqi regime and the three succeeding governments 
with five years and ten months the longest period of rule by decree since 1922. Al-
Sayyid Marsot calls Sidqi’s premiership (20 June 1930 – 22 September 1933) even 
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“the most repressive period of government Egypt had known.”239 Besides, on 20 
October 1930, a royal decree disbanded all the – mostly pro-Wafdist – Provincial 
Councils.240 All in all it was the third stroke against constitutional government by the 
king. In the early 1930s, when the depression stroke Egypt’s population hard, when 
people in daily demonstrations shouted against the king, and even an attempt to 
assassinate Sidqi himself was undertook, his government became “a byword for 
corruption and the abuse of power.”241 Besides, in 1934 the financial pressures 
induced the government to provide for the re-establishment of Provincial Councils, 
but interestingly the local notables, whose highly profitable cotton trade depended to 
a large extent on the central government and the British, favored protection of their 
economic interests instead of increased responsibility and accountability and therefor 
perpetuated a pattern of dependency on the central government.242 
The second major split inside the Wafd happened in 1937, when the banker Nokrashi 
Pasha left the party and, two years later, founded the Saadist Party, which was 
joined mainly by industrialists.243 On Fu’ad’s initiative, another new party, al-Ittihad, 
was established out of courtiers and Wafd dissidents, to represent his interests in the 
House.244 But it was formed solely of bankers and great landowners, and hardly 
attracted support amongst the population.245 Moreover, parliament as a whole was 
dominated by landowners and did not allow the creation of fellah labor unions 
(landowners, representing only two percent of the population, controlled half the 
land).246 
As mentioned above, one of the main reasons for the failure of the “liberal 
experiment” in Egypt was that King Fu’ad and his successor Farouk (1936-52) 
obstructed parliamentarianism as much as they could, dismissed ministers and 
dissolved the House time and again. In the 28 years between 1924 and 1952, 
parliament was, altogether, only for 17 years in session. For the remaining 11 years, 
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the monarchs ruled by decrees. 247  The Wafd’s lack of interest, or at best 
conservative approach towards social issues, already mentioned above, became a 
problem when the third al-Nahas government failed in negotiating complete 
independence from Britain. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 was for most 
Egyptians not satisfying on that matter. Though the government assumed full 
administrative control over its armed forces, Capitulations were abolished, and the 
Mixed Tribunals were to be closed after a transition period of twelve years, the 
defense of Egypt was kept to Britain. This was now called “Anglo-Egyptian military 
alliance” instead of “occupation”, leaving 10.000 British soldiers in the Canal Zone. 
Moreover, the question of sovereignty over the Sudan was still not settled, leaving 
the country, for the time being, under British administration. 248  Overpopulation, 
unemployment and the education problem were not solved either, fostering political 
extremism and activism both from the leftist and the right. 
All this resulted in a political radicalization in the 1930s, which mirrored also the 
political mainstream in Europe, where simultaneously more and more fascist parties 
came to power. Sidqi’s cabinet was by most Egyptians believed to be supported by 
the British government, but the disastrous economical situation was generally blamed 
on the influence of Europeans, resulting in a “rejection of the British presence, 
[which] was equated with a rejection of everything foreign”.249 Amongst the religious 
reaction, the conservative Muslim response shall here be mentioned first, which is 
mainly represented by Shaykh Hassan al-Banna’s formation of the Muslim 
Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimum) in 1928 and by Rashid Rida’s Salafiyya, the 
latter one propagating a medieval Islam influenced by the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya 
(1263-1328) and Muhammad Abdul Wahhab (1703-1792). Besides, there were other 
organizations like the Pan-Islamic Young Men’s Muslim Association (YMMA), 
founded by the Abdul Hamid Sa’id in 1927, which soon became a counterpart to the 
Christian YMCA.250 The conservative Muslim contribution to political life in Egypt will 
be dealt with more detailed in the final chapter of this paper. 
Radicalization in the secular sphere of politics was expressed e.g. in the Wafdist 
Vanguard, which represented the left wing of the Wafd and sought to equip the party 
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with a revolutionary social and nationalist program, establishing links to the 
communist “New Dawn” movement as well as to Marxist groups.251 Besides, the 
Wafd established a paramilitary youth organization, the Blue Shirts, which were 
“founded to mobilize party followers and the masses, as well as to intimidate and 
terrorize the opposition.”252 On the extreme right, the Blue Shirts were countered by 
the anti-Western, religious, patriotic, militaristic, and socially conservative movement 
Young Egypt (Misr al-Fatat), wearing Green Shirts.253 The ideology of Young Egypt 
can be characterized by their slogan “Country, Islam, and King”.254 Founded in 1933 
and transformed into an official political party in 1938, it reflected the discontent of 
liberal, secular, “European” democracy in Egypt. In 1940 the party changed its name 
into National Islamic Party and became even more radically religious and chauvinist. 
Finally, before the 1952 coup d’état, it was renamed into Socialist Party, but though it 
then stressed anti-imperialism and social reform, it always remained a small 
opposition group.255 
The liberal experiment last not least failed, because the continuous “three-sided 
political manoeuvres that necessitated a coalition of two against the third marred 
political life and injected an element of intrigue into it. Sooner or later either the king 
or the political party in power had to go to the British High Commissioner as the final 
arbiter, instead of appealing to parliament.”256 
Already in the late 1930s, King Farouk’s and many politician’s sympathies for the 
Axis powers became evident, but facing the advance of Rommel against Egypt in 
early 1942, the British government confronted the king with an ultimatum: either al-
Nahas, the leader of the Wafd, be appointed premier, or King Farouk would be 
deposed. Subsequently, the Wafd, “which had come into being on the strength of its 
opposition to the British presence in Egypt was now to collaborate with that very 
presence against the king.”257This, of course, shocked many Egyptians and further 
undermined the credibility of the party. In 1943, the publication of the so-called “Black 
Book” (al-Kitab al-aswad) by al-Nahas’ former fellow party member Makram Obayd, 
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blaiming the government of venality and indicting al-Nahas, further discredited the 
Wafd.258 But the main legitimization problem of the Egyptian Parliament resulted out 
of the fact that it represented only a small part of the Egyptian population, small 
groups or cliques that, though they were constituted in political parties, did not differ 
in their interests or programs; in fact their interests mostly did not differ from the 
monarch’s. Personal interests dominated political life, and El-Ghannam therefor uses 
the term “parliamentary oligarchy”259, a system that survived in Egypt until today. The 
Egyptian anthropologist Dr. Mohamed Yosri E. Debees confirms that, “In Islamic 
countries people do not differ between personal and professional relationships.”260 
The disastrous performance of the Egyptian army in the first Palestinian War (1948-
49) and the scandals around the private life of King Farouk were only the final coffin 
nails for the liberal experiment and led directly to the takeover of power by the Free 
Officers clique in 1952. Both extremist conservative-religious and radical leftist 
groups considered the Wafd “as the embodiment of privilege partly derived from 
political corruption.”261 As “a result of Wafdist restraints on the political process, the 
masses’ connection to mainstream political life in Egypt remained weak”262, for the 
whole period, and this should remain a characteristic of Egyptian political parties until 
today. 
 
2.4 The leftist and the highly contested working class 
“Why socialism, when we have Islam?”263 
The history of the Egyptian leftist can be traced back to the 1870s, when European, 
mainly Italian revolutionaries and anarchists fled repression in their home countries. 
Many of them went to Egypt, and e.g. the famous Errico Malatesta even fought at 
Urabi’s side against British troops in 1882. It was also in April 1882, when “several 
thousand coal-heavers at Port Said on the Suez Canal went on strike for higher 
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wages, an event that appears to have been the first major manifestation of collective 
action by indigenous workers in modern Egyptian history.” 264  As a result of 
urbanization since the last quarter of the 19th century265, a “nucleus of an industrial 
labour force began to grow in Cairo, Alexandria, Ismailiyya, Suez and Port Said.”266 
In the 1890s, a second wave of exiled Italian anarchists reached Egypt and founded 
anarchical newspapers and publications in Cairo and, foremost, in Alexandria.267 The 
first of these was La Tribuna Libera, published since October 1901 in Italian and 
French268, and edited by the native Palestine Jew Joseph Rosenthal, a jeweler and 
key figure of the early socialist movement in Egypt.269 But anarchical ideas were also 
discussed in well-established modernistic newspapers like al-Muqtataf or al-Hilal.270 
On 26 May 1901, the Free Popular University (Università Popolare Libera, UPL) was 
opened at the Theatre Zizinia in Alexandria. Inspired by anarchical intellectual and 
political ideas from Europe but with a specific Egyptian character, “it aimed to break 
free from national and religious frames of reference by offering a programme of free, 
modern and accessible education for all, and particularly ordinary people.”271 
Already at the turn of the century (December 1899 – February 1900), the Greek 
cigarette rollers organized the first strike in Cairo, demanding higher wages, shorter 
hours and better working conditions. They were experienced in trade unionism, and 
between 1899 and 1907, labor militancy and organization among several groups of 
mainly foreign skilled workers increased, although employers often skillfully 
manipulated tensions between the privileged foreign and the Egyptian workers who, 
furthermore, sometimes opted for loyalty towards the company bosses.272 In fact, 
unionization of foreign workers was often motivated by the ambition to protect their 
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own jobs and wages by excluding cheaper Egyptian labor from their trades. 
Nevertheless, the consciousness also of Egyptian workers was stimulated by these 
first, mostly small “craft unions” or, how the future nationalist leader Muhammad 
Farid commented unionization, “This European disease has spread to Egypt”.273 In 
1908, anarchists founded the Ligue Internationale des Ouvriers Cigarettiers et 
Papetiers du Caire, which was open both to Egyptians and foreigners.274 In the 
following year, the Nationalist Party supported the establishment of the “Manual 
Trades Worker’s Union”275, and on 31 July 1911, the tramway workers of Cairo, 
aspiring self-organization in a union too, started a major strike.276 
The costs of World War I affected the British protectorate Egypt and increased the 
socio-economical problems, and the widespread revolts during the 1919 Revolution 
against British occupation were the real turning point in the development of leftist 
societies enrooted within the population. 277  They were accompanied by the 
establishment of numerous unions in May and June 1919, which were supported or 
even led by bourgeois lawyers or notables, constituting a link between the labor and 
the nationalist movement. 278  In February 1921, on Rosenthal’s initiative, the 
Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) was founded, and in October of the same 
year, the Egyptian Socialist Party (ESP) established. Yet, only one year later, after 
having attended the Fourth Congress of the Communist International in Moscow (5 
November – 5 December 1922), the party was transformed into the Communist Party 
of Egypt (CPE), and Rosenthal, opposing any changes in the party line according to 
Moscow’s directives, was expelled.279 
However, it was mainly two problems, which the leftist movements faced: first that its 
ideas were transmitted by foreign workers (mainly Italians, Greeks, Jews and 
Armenians in Alexandria), who profited from the British occupation by higher loans 
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and other privileges280, and who therefor were not really credible as “Egyptian” 
movements – especially since they sought to downplay the importance of the 
nationalist struggle and criticized the bourgeois character of the nationalist leadership 
represented by the Wafd, the dominant political power between 1919 and 1952.281 
The second problem was the principal incompatibility of the classic leftist approach 
towards religion with the traditional religiousness of the mainly rural working class.282 
Even one of the most influential figures of the Egyptian socialist movement in the 
1930s, Isam al-Din Hifni Nasif, attempting to demonstrate the compatibility of Islam 
and socialism in his 1933 published book al-Mabadi ishtirakia (Principles of 
Socialism)283, could not do away with this contradiction. And one of Nasser’s Free 
Officers, Yusuf Mansur Siddiq, after having quit his membership in Curiel’s HADITU 
in 1950, argued that all commandments and ideals of socialism are consistent to 
Islam: social justice, peace amongst the peoples, equality and solidarity of all human 
beings, and abolition of exploitation284, concluding with the question quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter, “Why socialism, when we have Islam?” 
Since the all-dominant subject throughout the country – independence – was almost 
entirely in the hands of the Wafd, the leftist could not achieve a major role in Egypt’s 
politics. The Wafd only cooperated with leftists when it was advantageous for them 
otherwise considered it as a political concurrent and, facing increasing labor activism 
and strikes, actually as a threat to social order.285 Eventually, after a short heyday 
between 1921 and 1924, the government of Ahmad Ziwar banned the Communist 
Party on 5 June 1925 and arrested its leaders286, and the whole movement was 
limited to only a few scattered and isolated groups.287. One of the few groups worth 
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mentioning during the 1930s was the then founded Ligue Pacifiste, initiated by the 
Égyptiotes, the Greeks in Egypt, with branches in Cairo and Alexandria, and uniting 
leftists of all ethnics – Jews, Italians, Greeks and Egyptians.288 
However, the whole leftist was weak, compared to its European equivalents, not only 
since it was led mainly by foreigners, but also due to: first, the disastrous social 
status of the Egyptian workers, who concentrated their struggle rather on better living 
conditions than on the liberation of the working class; and second to most worker’s 
illiteracy, which hampered them to access, for instance, communist ideology.289 
Besides, the aftermaths of the traditional guilds in the 19th century prevented the 
development of class-consciousness. And political parties supported unions only 
when they hoped to gain thereby more votes in elections.290 
In the late 1930s, workers in the textile industry formed the core of the Egyptian 
worker’s movement. The spinners and weavers of the textile industries at Shubra al-
Khayma (a suburb of Cairo) had a weekly newspaper (Shubra) and, with the Shubra 
al-Khayma Mechanized Textile Worker’s Union (SKMTWU), “one of the most militant, 
best organized, and politically independent trade unions in Egypt by the early days of 
World War II.”291 But many strikes had to be aborted, since the unions were not 
provided with enough money for strike-pays, and Egyptian workers still lacked a 
leftist political consciousness at that time: e.g., in 1939, textile workers had founded a 
union, which, after a strike, had achieved the fulfillment of their demands. But when 
the government sent the police to arrest the union officials, the workers did not react 
in any way, and the union therefore dissolved. Only then the workers realized that 
there was nobody to fight for their rights, and they re-established it.292 
With the approach of World War II, the British authorities changed their policy 
towards labor movements. Instead of repression, cooption was their new strategy, 
and thus, “British colonial policy makers began to encourage the enactment of labor 
legislation, including the legalization of trade unions.”293 In August 1939, the Ministry 
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of Social Affairs, with an attached special Department of Co-operatives, was 
established for the first time.294 Eventually, also the Wafd sought to win the support of 
workers, and in September 1942, enactment law 85 granted “explicit legal recognition 
to trade unions for the first time in Egypt”295, although there were some restrictions: 
they were not allowed to be politically active; public servants, rural and hospital 
workers were not permitted to unions, and the unions themselves were strictly 
controlled by the government.296 
In the 1940s, when the working class was already a core area in the political struggle 
between the Wafd, the minority parties and the Palace, new communist organizations 
emerged, commonly known as the “second communist movement.”297 When growing 
fascism in Europe was mirrored in political radicalization and increasing anti-
Semitism in Egypt, the Jewish Youth actually had only two alternatives for political 
activity: Marxism or Zionism.298  Therefor this second communist movement was 
borne by foreigners, mainly Jews, the most famous one being Henri Curiel (1914-
1978)299. Besides Curiel, two other Egyptian Jews, Hillel Schwartz and Marcel Israel, 
were the most prominent leaders of the Democratic Federation (al-Ittihad al-
Dimuqrati), an association of intellectuals founded in 1938/39. Though, on the one 
hand, the second communist movement sought to establish a society based on the 
(modern bourgeois) values of individualism and a democratic political system300, on 
the other hand it considered the Egyptian bourgeoisie traitors, due to its alliance with 
colonialism and feudalism, and therefore also despised parliament and democratic 
systems in general.301 
Between 1940 and 1942, the Democratic Federation split into three rival communist 
organizations: People’s Liberation (Tahrir al-Sha’b) led by Israel, ISKRA led by 
Schwartz, and the Egyptian Movement for National Liberation (EMNL – al-Haraka al-
Misriyya li’l-Tahrir al-Watani, abbreviated HAMITU) led by Curiel. While the first two 
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consisted almost exclusively of intellectuals, only the EMNL / HAMITU was 
successful in recruiting significant numbers of workers. Despite the ban of leftist and 
labor movements by a law promulgated on 11 July 1946 by Prime Minister Ismail 
Sidqi302, frequent cooperation between ISKRA and HAMITU in 1947 eventually led to 
their fusion into the Democratic Movement for National Liberation (DMNL – al-Haraka 
al-Dimuqratiyya li’l-Tahrir al-Watani, abbreviated HADITU). However, the communist 
movement was suffering factual contention, mainly between the HAMITU (and later 
HADITU) and the New Dawn group (eventually in 1958 these struggles were briefly 
abandoned with the establishment of the united Communist Party of Egypt).303 
But after the proclamation of the Jewish state of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent 
first Arab-Israeli War, the major problem for the second communist movement turned 
out to be its Jewish leadership and its support for the United Nations Partition Plan 
for Palestine, which made it easy both for nationalists and Islamic conservatives to 
denunciate the HADITU as Zionists. 304  Henri Curiel himself was arrested and 
expelled from Egypt on 26 August 1950. One and a half year later, the founding 
congress for a General Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions was planned for 27 
January 1952, but it was aborted due to the Cairo fire on the day before. In the 
aftermath of the fire, martial law was promulgated, and all Marxist organizations and 
publications were shut down.305 
In the course of the third Marxist movement, Fu’ad Morsi and Ismail Sabri Abdallah, 
two economists who had studied in Paris, had founded a new Communist Party of 
Egypt (CPE) on 1 January 1950, which existed until 1957.306 But since it denounced 
the Nasserist regime after the coup d’état of 23 July 1952 as a pro-American fascist 
dictatorship, it had to remain underground until Nasser concluded an arms purchase 
agreement with Czechoslovakia in September 1955. This weapon purchase as well 
as Nasser’s “patriotism”, his neutral positioning at the Bandung conference in the 
same year, the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 and his nationalization 
policy in general, as well as his turning away from the West, then encouraged many 
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leftists to support the regime. 307  Nevertheless, thousands of communists were 
arrested in 1959308, amongst them the feminist activist Soraya Adham, who declared 
during the police questioning, “le peuple choisisse lui-même son système de 
gouvernement, que celui-ci élargisse les libertés politiques du peuple afin qu’il 
s’organise lui-même. [?] De même, elle considère obligatoire l’élection d’une 
assemblée constituante pour élaborer la constitution de la République arabe unie 
que le peuple accepte et qui gouverne sur cette base. [?] De même, elle considère 
que la nature du développement dans notre pays et de nos intérêts est que 
prédomine un système socialiste qui combatte l’exploitation et qui agisse pour 
l’extension (nachr) de la démocratie. [?] De même, elle approuve tout ce que le 
peuple choisit concernant la nature du régime qu’il souhaite voir gouverner.“309 
Although the CPE advocated only secret union trade work and therefore had no 
influence at all in the trade union movement,310 leftist intellectuals had an ambivalent 
attitude towards Nasser’s Free Officers and vice versa, as will be shown also in the 
next chapter. Their friendly stance against the “patriotic” government did not change, 
when the regime tightened its control over the workers movement by coopting unions 
in 1957.311 This chatting-up eventually culminated in the self-dissolution of the two 
biggest communist organizations in 1965. 312  Many of their members had been 
confident, that Nasser would welcome them as political advisors in his “Arab Socialist 
Union” (ASU), founded three years earlier. But “[t]hose who believed that the 
dissolution of the party would result in their direct participation in the intellectual 
leadership of the socialist transformation of Egypt soon discovered that they were 
isolated, quarantined, and contained.” 313  However, by supporting the regime, 
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Marxists had already before lost their ability and legitimization to articulate an 
independent voice in Egyptian political life.314 
Looking at the legacy of the leftist in general, and of Marxist movements in particular, 
one might say with Beinin, “On peut dire que malgré ses nombreuses faiblesses, le 
mouvement marxiste fut pionnier dans sa façon de lier les questions nationales et 
sociales en Égypte. Il a permis à de nombreux travailleurs de développer une 
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3. Political changes from Nasser to Sadat 
3.1 The “Revolution” of 1952 and the Nasser regime 
“’Mansour Bahi is very intelligent, don’t you think?’ I asked. ‘He doesn’t talk 
much, but goes quietly to work. A true child of the Revolution.’ ‘Why should 
he or anyone else go along with the Revolution?’ ‘You speak as if there 
were no peasants, no workers, no youth in the land.’ ‘The Revolution has 
stolen the property of a few and the liberty of all.’ ‘You speak of liberty in the 
old sense,’ I said. ‘And when you were top dog you didn’t even show 
respect for that!’”316 
The “Revolution” of 23 July 1952 with the coming into power of the Revolutionary 
Command Council (RCC) under the chairmanship of Nasser, and the subsequent 
forced resignation of King Farouk (followed by the overthrow of the monarchy itself 
and the proclamation of a republic on 18 June 1953), were in fact a military coup of 
the Free Officers and not the result of a mass movement. Vatikiotis comes to the 
point when he cites two studies of the early 1960s by Egyptian Marxists in exile, 
according to which the events of that summer “meant nothing more than the 
replacement of a monarchy (which was assisted in governing by a propertied group 
of landowners, financiers, and administrators, as well as by a foreign power) with a 
new state bureaucratic élite of soldiers, technocrats, and petty officials.”317 For most 
Egyptians, however, the coup was insofar associated with hope for a better future, as 
for the first time in more than two thousand years, Egypt was in fact ruled by 
Egyptians. They believed not only that the officers were nationalists, who would end 
British meddling in Egyptian politics, but also that they would reform the country.318 
As a matter of fact, first the Free Officers around Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser and 
General Mohamed Naguib (the latter, according to Beinin & Lockman, being never a 
member of that movement and therefor serving as a focal point for all who opposed 
military rule319) were not sure, in which direction Egypt should go, what kind of 
government it should have and how to connect the mass of the population with their 
ideas and therefore broaden the basis of their regime to be established. Younis 
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explicates it as follows: “Bien que le nouveau régime ait reposé sur le principe de 
l’unité du peuple et qu’il ait considéré le système partisan comme un complot 
colonialiste, il n’avait ni une conception unique ni une idéologie claire.” 320  This 
explains the struggle between divergent factions among them and the political 
maneuvers that took place in the following two years. 
Four months before the revolution, in a circular-letter of March 1952, the officers 
demanded the abolition of capital punishment and censorship, the release of political 
prisoners and the reestablishment of the constitution.321 One statement by Mohamed 
Naguib also demonstrates, that the officers had not a real political program: “The 
primary aim of our movement is to purge the army itself of its corrupt elements and 
then to see that the government purges itself. We want to put and end to tyranny and 
corruption, and to strengthen the basis of the Constitution with a view to get the 
country’s interests.”322 The six-point program, announced by the RCC soon after its 
takeover, advocated, besides the creation of a strong national army and the assertion 
of full Egyptian independence and sovereignty, furthermore the abolition of the 
remnants of feudalism, the purification of political life, the establishment of 
democracy (!) and the promotion of social justice.323 
In fact, the Free Officers, like most Egyptians, did not believe in the failure of 
constitutionalism per se, but rather in the manipulation of the liberal experiment by 
the British and the king, and the negative effect of backbiting between the political 
parties. The parties therefore were demanded to purge themselves from corrupt 
persons – a demand, which, of course, could be easily misused for extinguishing any 
opposition. One of the reasons for the inexplicit political direction was for sure, that 
before the coup, the officers had different political homes and were connected with 
diverging movements. Anwar al-Sadat, for instance, was a sympathizer of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and Nasser was in touch both with the communist Democratic 
Movement for National Liberation and the Muslim Brethren324, whereas others came 
from Misr al-Fatat (Young Egypt), or from leftist groups. Aclimandos, however, 
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argues, that there were probably no more than 25 or 30 Marxist officers in the 
army325 , because most soldiers were deterred by the militant atheism and the 
communist approach towards the Palestine question (yet, most communist leaders 
were Jews).326 
Vatikiotis mentions, as the two major consequences of the 1952 coup, the abolition of 
the monarchy, and the “suspension of political life by the suppression of all organized 
political groups”, whether they ever have been represented in parliament or not.327 
Already on 23 July 1952, the Free Officers had forced King Farouk to appoint Ali 
Mahir Pasha prime minister. Mahir, whom the officers trusted, had cleverly avoided 
the reconvention of the abolished former parliament, and declared the cabinet to be 
in charge of appointing the regency council for the baby king Fu’ad II, who ought to 
succeed his father Farouk (ultimately for less than one year).328 Initially, the leading 
political figures of the country applauded the officers for their intervention, which 
should eventually sweep themselves all away: “In traditional political style all the 
party leaders hastened to congratulate the army for ridding the country of the ‘tyrant’ 
Faruq and to swear undying loyalty to the ‘revolution’.”329 But already on 12 and 13 
August 1952, a strike at the Misr Company textile factories in Kafr al-Dawar, south of 
Alexandria, where the workers declared their support for Naguib and the officer’s 
regime, and demanded representation by a union and the removal of five managers, 
was crushed down violently by the army, and resulted in the arrests of 545 
workers. 330  After a hastily conscribed military tribunal two workers, allegedly 
communists, were sentenced to death, clearly indicating “the absolute hostility of 
most of the Free Officers towards independent action by the working class, even 
when taken in support of the army.”331 
On the other hand, on 9 September, a radical agrarian reform was decreed, “limiting 
land ownership, the source of the wealth and influence of the ancien régime”332 and 
thus breaking the power of the rural notables. At the same time, the attempt to 
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establish a new system of local administration should provide support among the 
rural masses.333 It was, however, not only due to such popular measures, that both 
communist organizations as well as the Muslim Brotherhood continued to back the 
new regime. Whereas the DMNL (Democratic Movement for National Liberation) and 
the FCGFETU (Founding Committee for a General Federation of Egyptian Trade 
Unions) still hoped to alter the balance of forces within the junta, the Muslim Brethren 
willingly participated in the RCC’s anticommunist campaign.334 
Nevertheless, both the Wafd under al-Nahas and the Muslim Brotherhood demanded 
a reconvention of parliament and parliamentary elections.335 Elections had already 
been postponed from October 1952 to February 1953, but before they eventually 
could take place, “the junta declared on 10 December the abolition of the 1923 
Constitution.”336 Even ex-prime minister Mahir had declared publicly, “The present 
Constitution does not meet the need of a free and developed democracy. Parliament 
must actually represent all sections of the nation, political and economic, workers and 
technicians. It must be a living mirror of the nation. The major outlines for this project 
must be submitted to a Constituent Assembly or to a National Congress, so that the 
people may make its choice.”337 
There were, however, also members of the Free Officer’s movement, like the 
Marxists Khalid Mohieddin and Yusuf Mansur Siddiq, who both believed that 
necessary social reforms and parliamentarian democracy could be combined.338 But 
though a whole group around Mohamed Naguib truly preferred a return to 
constitutionalism, it was Naguib, who declared on 17 January 1953 a three-year 
transition period (until 16 January 1956), during which the RCC would rule, before a 
parliamentary system could be established again. On the same day, “all political 
parties were dissolved and banned, and their funds confiscated.” 339 The Muslim 
Brethren, being not a political party and thus not affected by this cabinet decree, 
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were prohibited after the assassination attempt on Nasser on 26 October 1954, 
which was allegedly organized by them. 
Six days later, on 23 January, a so-called Liberation Rally (Hayat al-Tahrir) was 
launched, which was not conceived as a political party, but as a kind of public 
assembly, associating the masses with the new regime, and representing the various 
political movements within all social ranks.340 “Liberation Rally is not a political party 
? the creation was prompted by the desire to establish a body that would organize 
the people’s forces and overhaul the social setup. The Liberation Rally is the school 
where the people will be taught how to elect their representatives properly.”341 
After the RCC had decreed Egypt a republic on 18 June 1953, it appointed Mohamed 
Naguib first President in addition to being Prime Minister, while Nasser became 
Deputy Premier and Minister of the Interior. 342  In the subsequent, somewhat 
confusing power struggle between the two, Naguib resigned as president, but 
returned to office when riots and strikes broke out, demonstrating public support both 
for his person and his renowned notion for parliamentary rule. But eventually both the 
DMNL’s reluctance to openly denounce the new regime, resulting in disaffection and 
splits within the organization343, and the RCC’s, respectively Liberation Rally’s labor 
policy, pursuing corporatism and paternalism and thus dividing the membership base 
of trade unions344, turned to account for Nasser. Concessions made by the junta 
around Nasser were temporary and served only as time-gaining devices.345 When 
censorship was abolished on 5 March 1954, former politicians immediately criticized 
the military regime and demanded a return to parliamentarianism; 40 university 
professors signed a petition calling the officers back to their barracks. On 25 March, 
the RCC announced a last resolution, stipulating four remarkable decisions: 
1) Political parties were admitted again and could reorganize 
2) The RCC would not form a political party and dissolve on 24 July 1954 
3) A Constituent Assembly should be elected freely and directly on 24 July 1954 
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4) One of the Constituent Assembly’s task should be the election of the President 
of the Republic346 
On the next day, massive pro-Naguib rallies took place all over Cairo347, answered at 
the following two days by a general strike, which was allegedly organized by the 
Liberation Rally.348 The Cairo bus, taxi and metro (but not the tramway) workers 
participated in the two-day strike, and their demands, being previously broadcast on 
the radio, were as follows: no legalization of political parties; the RCC should stay in 
power until British troops would have been fully evacuated; a National Assembly 
should be formed; and there should be no elections. Against this strike, the strongest 
trade union resistance came from Alexandria, where many union leaders issued a 
statement calling for the abolishment of martial law, the dissolution of the RCC, a 
guarantee for democratic liberties, the release of all jailed workers and reconstitution 
of all dissolved unions, the establishment of a general federation of trade unions, and 
the denouncement of all attempts to split the ranks of the workers. Naguib, however, 
vacillated and failed to mobilize his supporters.349 The implementation of the RCC’s 
resolution of 25 March was immediately postponed until the end of the “transition 
period”, i.e., till January 1956. 350  Before 1956, a National Assembly should be 
convened, and on 18 April 1954, Nasser was appointed prime minister for the second 
time.351 
After having put Naguib under house arrest in November 1954 (he was accused of 
having had contacts with the Muslim Brethren in the connection with the attempted 
assassination on Nasser of 26 October352), Nasser was the uncontested leader of 
Egypt. Step by step, the country’s political and economical power were centralized, 
and Nasser’s personal rule institutionalized. Army officers acquired permanent 
bureaucratic functions and subsequently diplomatic posts, provincial governorships, 
and key positions for the planning of economic and social policy, establishing what 
Vatikiotis calls a stratiotocracy, a rule of soldiers.353 It might surprise that many 
workers and trade union leaders were willing to accept the consequences of the 
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RCC’s victory – the domination of the trade union movement by the government, the 
proscription of the right to strike, and the interdiction for workers to organize 
independently from government control.354 According to a typical authoritarian pattern, 
although the coup d’état of 1952 undoubtedly had benefited from the initial support of 
leftist groups as well as from the Muslim Brethren, the new regime, when it felt safe 
enough, banned them all, for not having to share the power with them.355 
But, what might surprise even more is, that liberal intellectuals, socialists and 
communists have contributed to formulate and support a modern authoritarian 
discourse in the midst 1950s.356 Fu’ad Morsi, general secretary of the CPE and 
leader of the Al-Raya movement, basically said, that freedom is for the majority and 
not for the minority, and it does not inevitably mean diversity of opinion (inqisam al-
ra’y), a multi-party system (ta‘addud al-ahzâb) or the existence of an opposition 
(qiyam al-mu’arada). According to Morsi, democracy means the protection of the 
majority by the government.357 As the most determined advocate of the Marxist logic 
of the “historic task”, Fu’ad Morsi also wrote, “La démocratie n’est pas un objectif en 
elle-même, cependant elle est un moyen pour engager le combat du progrès social? 
car la démocratie se réalise par la capacité de participation de l’ensemble du peuple 
à la réalisation des tâches historiques [?] La liberté politique pour le peuple? [est] 
sa liberté dans l’expression de ses buts historiques et son auto-organisation pour les 
réaliser [et la majorité doit] disposer de ses libertés naturelles dans la constitution, 
l’appui et la protection de son gouvernement? Donc, cela ne donne pas de sens à 
l’opposition? ceci est un des critères de la démocratie.“358 
In the leftist discourse, economic planning was a central element. The already 
mentioned agrarian reform law of 9 September was not only popular with the masses, 
but also compatible with the leftist ideology, whereby central planning legitimates 
governmental intervention in many sectors.359 Moreover, leftist intellectuals like Baha 
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al-Din Ahmad stressed the dangers of democracy for a state dominated economy. In 
his writings, he advocated for a “controlled democracy” by reminding his audience of 
the deplorable condition of society during the monarchy.360 
Yet, for the Egyptian people, charismatic Nasser maintained the illusion of 
participation and shura by officially basing his personal rule on the, “legitimating 
principle of the people’s consent. [?] This bottom-up approach aimed to translate the 
desires and wants of the people into state policies and national socio-economic 
strategies.”361 Differing from this idealized point of view, Al-Sayyid Marsot critically 
remarks, “In brief, the new regime, though it did not allow the population a share in 
government, allowed them the semblance of participation. Claiming to act in the 
name of the people while directing policies hatched by a small group of bureaucrats, 
it nonetheless allowed the people to believe they were participating in decision-
making.”362 And Vatikiotis gets to the point by stating, “Because Nasser believed he 
embodied the aspirations of the Egyptians and reflected their will, he saw no need for 
political representation for them.”363 
The fact, that everybody who declared his discontent with the regime, was pursued 
by the intelligence apparatus, jailed, tortured, or even killed, certainly casts an even 
darker cloud on Nasser’s propagated ideal image of the “’hero’, [that] was 
manifesting himself through the ‘will of his people’”.364 The arrests of 545 workers 
after the Kafr al-Dawar strike in August 1952365, of 101 political figures, mainly 
communists, on 17 January 1953, when political parties were banned 366 , the 
imprisonment of some 120 students, when the universities were closed down on 1 
March 1954 367 , and the further arrests and purges of leftists and communists 
throughout 1955 and 1956368, are only some early examples for the efficiency of the 
national intelligence service. This secret police was established in August 1952 and 
reorganized under Nasser into five special departments, responsible for the security 
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of the president, the government, the army, the later single political party ASU (Arab 
Socialist Union), and for “general security”369. Though Nasser, who mocked the 
tripartite alliance of the British, the French, and the Israeli in the Suez Crisis 1956/57, 
and who’s soldiers fought in Yemen and Algeria, was praised by the masses – not so 
much by the political leaders – in the Middle East, there was a dark side of his regime. 
Numerous accounts for political trials could be mentioned here, and even Tarek 
Osman, besides his sometimes understandable admiration for the “leader of the Arab 
nation”, admits, “There are disturbing accounts of the systematic torturing of Muslim 
Brotherhood members in the 1950s and 1960s and the collective punishment of 
Egyptian Communists: all distressing examples of the immense power of the 
country’s interior ministry and intelligence services, which repeatedly trounced any 
rule of law.”370 
The Bar Association, which had played a major role in drafting the 1923 constitution, 
and which both had called the military after the revolution to return to its barracks and 
had supported Mohamed Naguib in his struggle against Nasser, was also taken a 
hard line with: its board was dissolved in April 1954 and replaced by a new one. After 
the formation of the “Arab Socialist Union” in 1962, each candidate for the board had 
to be a member of the ASU.371 Besides, in 1952 all private or family Waqfs (religious 
endowments), and three years later, both the Shari’a Courts and those of the non-
Muslim communities were abolished. From then on, all litigation was entrusted to the 
National Courts, which took over most of the former qadis.372 
Censorship of the press was reintroduced, together with the ban of political parties, in 
1954, when all party newspapers were dissolved, and the regime founded its own 
papers like al-Gumhuriya (“The Republic”), al-Missa (“The Evening”) and ash-Shaab 
(“The People”). In May 1960, the “capitalist press” was expropriated, and the 
government from then on both appointed all chief editors and dictated the 
newspaper’s content. Already in the monarchy, radio had been monopolized by the 
state, and it was henceforth used by the Nasser regime, just like the 1960 founded 
Egyptian television, as a means of government propaganda.373 
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The popular slogan, “We are all Nasser”374, idealizing Nasser’s rule, reflects his – in 
fact failed – ambition to associate the masses with the new regime. This implied, of 
course, only native Egyptians. The foreigners, who had contributed to the economic 
boom of the big cities, for instance the “parikiès” called Greeks of Alexandria, felt 
urged by Nasser’s new laws erasing their former privileges, to leave the country, 
although many of them had even fought for their homeland in the militia and in the 
army during the Suez War.375 
Another aspect of Nasser’s “personal charismatic rule” was that all the projects and 
institutions he established were connected with him as a person and had, especially 
regarding political structures, no roots within the population. Osman states, that, 
“Nasser could not establish a state”, arguing, that, “he failed to link his project with 
the major advances of the liberal experiment that had preceded him.” 376  And 
Vatikiotis appositely writes, “The stability Nasser provided in Egypt by his charismatic 
personal rule stood in sharp contrast to the instability of the institutions he 
experimented with. During his rule he produced five parliaments with an average life 
of two years. He promulgated six constitutions. His cabinets had on average a 
lifespan of thirteen months.”377  We therefore will now have a look at the 1956 
constitution, the state institutions and the successive attempts to connect the 
Egyptian people with the new regime by forming national unity movements. 
The constitution drafted by the Constituent Assembly under Naguib in November 
1952, which stipulated a return to parliamentarianism, was abolished by Nasser and 
substituted by a new one promulgated on 17 January 1956.378 “The real innovation 
introduced by this constitutional charter (it was superseded in March 1958 when 
Syria and Egypt entered upon a union) was that it replaced a parliamentary form of 
government by a presidential system.”379 The constitution provided for a National 
Assembly without legislative competence, which was reserved for the State President, 
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. The Assembly was restricted to supervising the 
practice of the executive (art. 66). The presidential power was overwhelming. The 
president could not only convene (art. 72) and dissolve (art. 111) the Assembly and 
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both appoint and dismiss the ministers (art. 146), but he also could combine the 
office of Prime Minister and President in one hand (art. 64 and 131). He was 
authorized to conclude economical and political contracts without consulting the 
Assembly or the Cabinet. Additionally, he was, of course, supreme commander of the 
army. He was elected for six years by an absolute majority of the delegates, which 
mandate had to be confirmed by an absolute majority through a plebiscite (art. 121 
and 122). A possible re-election of the President was not mentioned in the 
constitution, and it was not possible to introduce a no-confidence vote against him as 
prime minister (yet, a prime minister who was not simultaneously state president 
could very well get a no-confidence vote).380 On the provincial level, the constitution 
was contradictory: “Whereas it emphasized local administration, it strengthened the 
grip of the central government on the local units to such an extent that it made little 
provision for local autonomy or even initiative.”381 
The Liberation Rally was replaced by the “National Union”, also a single party. Its 
main task was to screen and select nominees for election to the National Assembly, 
securing that “the slate contained names of government-sponsored candidates 
only.”382 Ironically, the principle of a single party was not alien for the Egyptian 
communists. Though many left modernists had advocated the idea of expanding the 
authority of parliament at the expense of the president’s, at the same time they 
thought that parliament on its part must be strictly controlled and disciplined by a 
cadre party to balance the power of the president and to defend the revolution.383 
Besides, it should be mentioned, that the constitution of 1956 provided suffrage not 
only to men but also to all women of full age. According to art. 11, men and women 
had equal rights in all political, social, cultural and economic fields.384 
However, after the 99,8% approval of the constitution and the 99,8% election of 
Nasser for President of the Republic by plebiscites in June 1956, the elections for the 
Assembly were postponed, due to the Suez Crisis, to May 1957.385 These elections 
were symptomatic for all elections to follow until 2010, for they were rigged in various 
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ways: first of all, half of the 2.500 candidates for the 350 seats of the Assembly were 
disqualified by the government appointed National Executive Committee of the 
Union. 386  The top-level functionaries of the regime ran for office in their 
constituencies without rival candidates, bringing many candidates to withdraw as a 
measure of protest or because they realized the forlornness of their candidacy. In five 
constituencies, the final results of the second ballot were not published and annulled, 
for Nasser did not accept the winning candidates.387 
Due to the union with Syria in the so-called United Arab Republic (U.A.R., February 
1958 – September 1961), the Assembly, which had served “only as a dutiful 
audience for ministerial and presidential speeches”388, was dissolved already in 
March 1958. The union brought, besides the abolishment of the 1956 constitution in 
Egypt and the replacement of political parties in Syria by the National Union as well, 
no changes on the highest political level. The Egyptian presidential system was 
extended to Syria (and Nasser elected president of the U.A.R. by both parliaments 
and a subsequent plebiscite on 21 February 1958), and the new National Assembly 
for the union had not more competences than the former Egyptian one. Merely, on 
the local level, law no. 124 of 1960 divided the U.A.R. into administrative units 
(governorates, towns and villages), each of which “had an elected council 
empowered with broad authority and administrative responsibilities.”389 Besides, all 
major decisions were made in Cairo, which finally led to a coup d’état in Syria and 
the dissolution of the union on 28 September 1961.390 
The break-up of the union effectuated in a reorganization of Nasser’s regime. After 
the formation of a new government, a Preparatory Committee of the National 
Congress of Popular Forces was established, “to prepare the ground for a National 
Congress which would lay down a Charter for National Action.”391 But though the 
National Congress was to derive half of its members among the peasantry and the 
workers, and should act as a legislature, it was “extremely limited in its effectiveness 
and more a rubber stamp for the government.”392 The National Charter embodied the 
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principles of Islam, Arab nationalism and socialism (the latter understood by Nasser 
mainly as nationalization of banks, the press, and of commercial and industrial 
enterprises393), and “intended to create a new Arab society in Egypt.”394 Promulgated 
in a speech by Nasser on 21 May 1962, the Charter was to set up the basic 
principles for the political, economical and social development of the country. 
Without officially moving towards communism, though there was an open political 
rapprochement towards the Soviet Union since the World Bank and the USA had 
recalled their financial support for the Aswan High Dam project (July 1956), the 
Charter was also based on the idea of exploiting Marxist principles as long as they 
were useful for the regime.395 Incidentally, communists like Ahmed Ali Naguib vice 
versa argued, that the working class was sufficiently represented in the regime by the 
Charter, defining it as the “alliance of the workers”396. There were a lot of hollow 
words in the Charter about the freedom of citizens and progress, about the will and 
the wishes of the people and its close relatedness to the leadership, but in fact, the 
Charter was much more an anticipatory justification for Nasser, designed to 
propagate his private, ambitious experiments as being the intention of all 
Egyptians.397 
The second important issue the Charter provided was the creation of a new state 
political structure, the so-called Arab Socialist Union (ASU), which replaced the 
National Union, but actually “did not differ drastically in its organization in so far as its 
pyramidal structure and organization from village and the basic units to those on the 
district, provincial and national level was concerned.” 398  The ASU allegedly 
transmitted the views and sentiments of the people to the collective leadership under 
Nasser’s presidency. For this purpose, half of its members were to be drawn from 
peasants and workers (a doctrine, the parliament retained commitment to up to 
Mubarak399) – nevertheless, the line of command was not from the bottom up, but top 
down, therefor assuring the accomplishment of the top level party decisions without 
any contradiction. Besides, all members were proposed by the next higher body 
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inside the ASU, and besides the full members, there were interim members who had 
to accomplish a six months probation time.400 
All these institutional changes were finally only “window-dressing with no real 
attempts at mass mobilization or at setting up a genuine representative 
apparatus.”401 In general, the 1960s marked an era of autocracy and centralism in 
Nasser’s Egypt, “which was most clearly reflected in the wide authority given to the 
governorate over both the towns and villages, making it a kind of state in 
miniature.”402 The reasons for Nasser’s failure to enable more popular participation in 
the local administration are pinpointed in the following statement: “The intent was to 
synchronise the strategy of functional decentralisation of services with territorial 
prefectural structure and with the strategy of political cooptation of the locals through 
bureaucracy and the ASU. The three strategies did not mix together and produced 
contradictions, which bred inertia into the whole system of local administration. 
Tensions over the boundaries of authorities, resource allocations and specifications 
of functions ensued.”403 
However, the disastrous defeat of the Egyptian army in the 1967 Six Day-War and 
the subsequent breakdown of the economy strongly weakened Nasser’s prestige and 
even prompted former close allies to distance themselves from the regime and its 
policies. For example, Abd al-Hakim Amir, one of Nasser’s oldest friends, resigned in 
protest as commander-in-chief of the army. Moreover, he called, besides for a halt to 
socialist policies, “for the freedom of the press, [?] for a more democratic form of 
government, and for the formation of opposition parties.”404 After his arrest and 
subsequent coerced suicide in August 1967, there were the first riots by students in 
February 1968 (initially criticizing the lenient sentences passed on the culprits of the 
Six Day War defeat)405, followed by even bloodier ones in November, when both 
students and workers demanded the abolition of the ASU, a free Assembly and major 
internal reforms.406 
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The manifesto “Mandate for Change”, issued on 30 March 1968 in response to the 
public outcry of dissatisfaction, in which Nasser “proclaimed his intention to cleanse 
his régime of corrupt ‘centres of power’, liberalize its political arrangements and work 
assiduously for the reconstruction of a strong and healthy political order using the 
Arab Socialist Union, and rebuild the country’s defenses”407 helped, though it was 
never implemented, abate the turmoil. It was a means of disguising reality, just like 
the provisional constitution of 1964, which stipulated equality of all Egyptians (art. 24), 
freedom of expression and of the press (art. 35 and 36), freedom of assembly (art. 
37), the right to constitute unions (art. 41)408, ministerial responsibility to the National 
Assembly (art. 83)409 , and which assured the independence of jurisdiction (art. 
152).410 These and many other freedoms and stipulations were restricted not only by 
the repeatedly apodosis “within the limitations of the law”, but proofed to be thwarted 
by the political and administrative practice. 
 
3.2 Al-Infitah and tentative political reforms in the Sadat era 
“The story goes that on the first day Sadat got into the presidential 
limousine he waited until the car reached a crossroads and then asked the 
chauffeur, ‘Where did the rais [Arabic for leader, chief or head of the state, 
here referring to Nasser] turn here?’ ‘He turned left’, was the answer. 
‘Signal left and turn right’, said Sadat.”411 
This short story stands for the economic and political change President Anwar al-
Sadat initiated in May 1971, only eight months after Nasser’s sudden death on 28 
September 1970, after his successor had ousted his political rivals. 412 This change 
also provoked a redistribution of power from the very beginning of Sadat’s presidency. 
Unlike Nasser, “the typical product of urban Egypt in the 1930s, [?] Sadat was 
essentially a rifi, or village type.”413 Moreover, he recognized the provincial elites, 
including the agrarian bourgeoisie, whom his predecessor had ousted from power, as 
potential allies to consolidate his own. Therefore he sought to give these notables a 
share of power by introducing relatively more decentralized localities. Competences 
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were transferred to them, which was not only demonstrated by the replacement of 
the 1960 title “Local Administration” with “Local Government” and the abolishment of 
the Ministry of Local Government in 1971414, but also in the constitution promulgated 
in the same year’s September. In the Third Branch of the new constitution, entitled 
Local Administration, article 162 stipulates as follows: “Local People’s Councils shall 
be gradually formed, on the level of administrative units by direct election half the 
members of whom must be farmers and workers. The law shall provide for the 
gradual transfer of authority to the local People’s Councils. Presidents and Vice-
Presidents of the Councils shall be elected from among their members.”415 However, 
it turned out, that the new concept of local government replacing former local 
administration “had not really been fully accepted either by the traditional rural 
leadership or by the central and local bureaucrats.”416 
The 1971 constitution granted the People’s Assembly supremacy over the single 
party ASU, thus signalizing the return of Egypt to a relatively liberal political life, 
although Sadat thereby did not announce the country’s departure from the single 
party system.417 Vatikiotis comes to the point by stating, “What was being introduced 
under his controlled change was not so much an element of pluralism in Egyptian 
political life as one of diversity.”418 
Due to Egypt’s dramatic economical situation, already Nasser had been forced to 
reconsider his favored state socialism and start to move towards a freer form of 
economy.419 Sadat accelerated this policy in a combined switch both politically and 
economically. In July 1972 he expelled all Soviet advisors and other personnel from 
the country, pursuing an alliance with the rich, conservative Arab states, most 
prominent among them Saudi Arabia, in order to attract massive foreign capital and 
to encourage the revival of the private sector of the Egyptian economy.420 After the 
October War of 1973 (in the West known as Yom Kippur War), which was considered 
by most Egyptians a strategic victory, Sadat felt strong enough “to break with 
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Nasserism and preach a whole new political strategy to Egyptians.”421 Al-Sayyid 
Marsot even argues, that the president had initiated this war to give him the political 
backing for his new policy by regaining the Sinai.422 
The new strategy, al-infitah (literally “the opening up”, commonly called “open-door 
policy”), was in fact originally a political rather than an economic project423 and was 
promulgated both in the “October Declaration” of 1974 and the subsequent 
Investment Law No. 43/1974, which actually became its central element. With this 
strategy, Sadat hoped to attract foreign investment capital – not only of the Gulf 
States, but also of the West –, to increase the participation of the private sector, 
create greater competition for the costly public sector, and eventually pay more 
attention to agricultural development. 424 Last not least, the massive reduction of the 
military budget, which was enabled first by the policy of détente against Israel (i.e. 
Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and the Camp David accords a year later), and 
second by US-subsidies adding up to two billion dollars a year, should subsequently 
disseminate power from the military establishment and the huge and corrupt state 
bureaucracy, help creating a new middle class and thus “laying the seeds of a 
democratic, capitalist, Western-oriented Egypt.”425 For a while, censorship was lifted 
from the mass media, the courts were reformed, selective de-sequestrations of 
property and assets happened, and the security services were acting less clumsy.426 
In 1975, the year following the promulgation of infitah, another serious attempt was 
undertaken to establish local government in Egypt: law no. 52 of 1975 provided for 
the parallel existence of elected local councils and local executive commissions and, 
furthermore, dropped the requirement of active ASU-membership for the candidature 
to local councils. However, both the governor and the head of the local units retained 
the right to veto decisions taken by the elected local councils and thus limited popular 
participation in decision-making.427 Sadat did not want real democracy to happen 
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during his office. Significantly, he once told Ahmed Bahaa El-Din, ex-editor-in-chief of 
Al-Ahram, “Nasser and I are the last pharaohs.”428 
Yet, infitah failed for several reasons. First, the peace settlement with Israel provoked 
hostile reactions in the Arab world, resulting in the denial of Saudi and Kuwaiti 
investments and economic help, which Egypt tried to replace by American and West 
European aid.429 Second, and much more fatal, the only profiteers of infitah were the 
regime and its allies and cronies, assuming enormous wealth by the acquisition of 
industrial units, land and real-estate property like tourist hotels in southern Sinai and 
at the Red Sea. Third, the rise of the private sector and the decline of the role and 
status of the public sector led to substantial income gaps between the two, whereby, 
tightened by high inflation, the traditional middle class, the state officials, suffered a 
drastic erosion of its purchasing power. Fourth, the government slowly but steadily 
reduced the social safety net, hence making the situation of the poor majority of the 
population even more desperate.430 
In the middle of the 1970s, Sadat gradually changed the single party system of Egypt 
into a multi party system. The already mentioned supremacy of parliament over the 
ASU, as stipulated in the 1971 constitution, had only been the first step. The 
introduction of market economy by infitah and the attempt to develop the country was 
also part of the strategy to deprive the ASU of its major role. And though Sadat, in 
several statements in his so-called October Papers of 1974 and 1975, refused any 
appeal “to fragment the national unity in an artificial manner through the formation of 
parties” 431 , the founding of left, right and centered “platforms” within the ASU 
eventually led to their establishment as political parties in 1976. The Liberal Party 
(LP) emanated from the right platform, and the National Unionist Progressive Party 
(NUPP) from the left platform. Two years later, in July 1978, the ASU was 
transformed into the National Democratic Party (NDP). The program and 
performance of these parties in the Mubarak era will be shortly described in the next 
chapter. 
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In the 1976 parliamentary elections, the army was denied to vote432, but since the 
Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition groups were prohibited, their supporters 
had to run as so-called “independents” in the ballots. Nevertheless, the result was 
embarrassing to the regime: though the ASU won 82 per cent of the seats, the total 
number of independent candidates, including Nasserists, Marxists, Wafdists, and 
Ikhwan (Muslim Brethren) members, exceeded the total number of party candidates. 
These independent deputies caused a lot of turmoil in the Assembly and exerted 
pressure on the government.433 The style of politics, which the Egyptian writer Louis 
Awad in 1974 had described as “government by monologue”434, was over – but just 
for a short period. 
In January 1977, when the cabinet, incited by the International Monetary Fund, 
announced it would remove subsidies from essential food commodities, instant riots 
broke out in Cairo, moving particularly against expensive cars and nightclubs, the 
symbols of affluence and foreign presence. The rampages were turned down 
violently by the army, and the political opposition was suppressed.435 The New Wafd 
Party, whose formation Sadat had approved in February 1978 as a “democratic 
makeup” to placate his western allies, was forced to disband itself eight months 
later.436 Though the regime had hoped to counteract the infiltration of the military 
establishment’s lower ranks by the Muslim Brethren, it was badly surprised by the 
enthusiasm, which young and old Egyptians alike expressed for the re-established 
Wafd party in January and February 1978.437 
As already mentioned, in July 1978, Sadat transformed the ASU into the National 
Democratic Party (NDP), whose motto was “food for every mouth and a house for 
every citizen”438, a slogan obviously formulated to sooth the tension on the street. But 
the new party, led by Sadat, did not differ essentially from its predecessor. Like the 
ASU, the NDP was structured and organized from the top down, and advancement 
within the party rather came from above than from the support of constituencies 
below. And just like the ASU before, the NDP infiltrated universities, professional 
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associations and syndicates throughout the country. However, there were two 
important differences: The NDP, though it had provincial and district committees, 
lacked any representation at the village level, reflecting the weak ties of the regime 
with the peasants – and, by the way, with workers. Instead, the NDP concentrated on 
the protection of the interest of the bourgeoisie, which had benefited from infitah, and 
with whom Sadat eventually came to identify.439 Springborg comes to the point by 
stating, “Rural political mobilization which occurred fitfully under the auspices of the 
ASU during the Nasser era, has given way entirely in the NDP to the priorities of 
control and demobilisation of the peasantry combined with the consolidation of power 
by the bourgeoisie. Erosion of the single party’s base in the labour movement has 
also occurred as independent labour activists have deserted the NDP for opposition 
parties.”440 
However, the few opposition parties that should soon emerge, suffered censorship, 
and their presses were frequently vandalized or shut down.441 In this connection, not 
only the forced self-disbanding of the New Wafd in 1978 must be seen, for the party 
had enjoyed growing support among the rural elites, but also the promulgation of law 
no. 43 of 1979. That law, which made the local governors (of course all members of 
the NDP) actually dictators in their provinces, and curtailed the local councils of their 
powers, represented another strike against the creation of a more representative 
system of local government. Furthermore, besides tighter control of the provinces, 
Sadat sought to secure a complete victory of the NDP in the elections, when “he 
reduced the number of members of the rural elites on the candidacy list, thus 
curtailing their representation in the People’s Assembly and increasing that of 
government officials and syndicate leaders.”442 
Bearing the development described above in mind, the establishment of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court (SCC) in 1979 seems surprising. Why should the authoritarian 
Egyptian regime encourage the establishment of a SCC (and subsequently 
Administrative Courts), hence giving every citizen the possibility to challenge the 
state both by the possibility to overturn administrative decisions as well as by 
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referring constitutional questions to the SCC? The answer is quite simple: Besides 
the fact, that its creation had been stipulated already in the 1971 constitution, there 
were several practical considerations behind Sadat’s decision: First, the SCC 
enabled the government to maintain respectively restore discipline within the state’s 
own bureaucracy; second, it served as a means to assure investors of the 
institutional protection of their property rights, to reduce corruption, abuse of power 
and the manipulation of local markets; and third, it performed a legitimizing function 
by providing legal recourse and some sense of justice for citizens, who were 
mistreated by local officials.443 The SCC, which is embedded in a law system with an 
institutional configuration similar to French judiciary, has three major functions: first, 
to provide issue binding interpretations of existing legislation in cases where 
divergent views emerge; second, to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction between different 
juridical bodies; and third, to perform judicial review of legislation. 444  These 
authorities should challenge the regime within the following decades with numerous 
cases in which mainly political parties, but also other organizations and individuals, 
used the SCC and the Administrative Courts to assert their rights, some of which will 
be mentioned in the next chapter on the Mubarak era. 
On 14 May 1980, President Sadat also took over premiership, and on 22 May, a 
referendum both allowed him to stay in office as president indefinitely and 
consecrated Sharia as the principal source of state legislation. On 25 September 
1980, 140 members of the new Consultative Council (Maglis al-Shura) were elected, 
most of them being members of the NDP.445 This Shura Assembly had also been 
already stipulated in the 1971 constitution. Two thirds of its members were to be 
elected by direct ballot, half of whose must be workers and farmers, and the other 
third is appointed by the President. According to art. 195 of the constitution, the 
Shura Assembly should be consulted in the following: “Proposals for the amendment 
of one or more articles of the Constitution; Draft laws complementary to the 
Constitution; Draft of the general plan for social and economic development, Peace 
treaties, alliances and all treaties affecting the territorial integrity of the State or those 
concerning sovereignty rights; Draft laws referred to the Assembly by the President 
of the Republic; Whatever matters referred to the Assembly by the President of the 
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Republic relative to the general policy of the State or its policy regarding Arab or 
foreign affairs. The Assembly should submit to the President of the Republic and the 
People’s Assembly its opinion on such matters.”446 
When he had resumed power, Sadat had freed the Muslim Brethren and generally 
encouraged the increasing religious current throughout the country. Thereby, he 
hoped to use it for his own purposes. But, “in doing so he helped create a movement 
that he neither understood nor controlled.”447 The Islamists immediately began to 
denounce corruption and oppose government policy, especially the peace settlement 
with Israel, and started to dominate student organizations. It was even easier for 
them to exploit widespread discontent with the government, since all opposition 
parties were banned. Violent clashes between militant Muslims and Copts happened 
repeatedly between 1977 and 1981 in Cairo, Alexandria, and parts of Upper Egypt. 
The regime answered this with the proscription of religious student unions, and finally 
the dissolution of thirteen religious organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood, 
as illegal. In September 1981, when Sadat ordered a mass arrest of 1,500 religious 
radicals, a small clique among them decided to act and assassinated him on 6 
October during the military parade commemorating the October War.448 
 
3.3 Mubarak’s “Pharaonic Political System” 
“The reason the country’s gone downhill is the absence of democracy. If 
there were a real democratic system, Egypt would be a great power. 
Egypt’s curse is dictatorship and dictatorship inevitably leads to poverty, 
corruption, and failure in all fields.”449 
The presidency of Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011) was an era without a “national 
project”, respectively political visions for Egypt, both in foreign and domestic affairs. 
Its economic initiatives and programs mainly aimed at improving the country’s 
infrastructure, but were never developed to structural reforms, while, during these 30 
years, the income gap between a small elite and the mass of the poor increased 
alarmingly. Whereas the regime lacked in leadership and in finding solutions for the 
sharpening socio-economic crisis, the Mubarak era was rather associated with 
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lethargy, stillness and lack of imagination. Instead of political reform, the president 
and his associates trusted in their security system, represented by various interior 
ministers, army commanders and the heads of the intelligence services.450 Osman 
specifies the number of Egypt’s internal security agencies before the 2011 Revolution 
with almost two million people.451 
Until his forced resignation on 11 February 2011, Mubarak ruled by presidential 
decrees, exploiting the state of emergency, which only shortly had been lifted in May 
1980, but re-established immediately after the assassination of Sadat on the grounds 
of fighting Islamist terror (it should be lifted again not before 25 January 2012, the 
first anniversary of the beginning of mass protests against Mubarak). 
The parliamentary system of Egypt in the Mubarak era must be characterized as a 
sham democracy, for all permitted parties were either founded and financed by the 
regime and therefore did not oppose it, or they were such small parties without any 
political influence that they served only as democratic fig leafs. Meanwhile, the only 
party that embodied political power was the NDP, which was closely connected and 
totally controlled by the regime. Following Nasser’s and Sadat’s tradition, also under 
Mubarak every political decision and development in the country was solely directed 
from above, namely the ruling clique around the president. Al-Sayyid Marsot points 
out, that in all presidential elections except in 2005, Mubarak was the sole candidate. 
He also states that, though since 1984 political parties of all persuasions except 
religious ones had been allowed, however, “the president still chooses the prime 
minister, and the entire cabinet is responsible to the president, not to parliament.”452 
Political scientist Hamdy Abdel Rahman Hassan from the University in Dubai 
therefore called the Mubarak regime, following the Egyptian geographer and scientist 
Gamal Himdan (1928-93), the “Pharaonic Political System” 453 , and Egypt a 
“presidential state”, in which all “authoritative and influential bodies of the state 
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machinery are subordinated to the presidency, formally or informally.”454 Goodson 
and Radwan sing from the same hymn sheet when they state that, “despite a 
constitution that embraces democratic principles, Egypt’s political institutions are 
dominated by the enormous powers of the executive which overwhelm the legislature 
and marginalize the judiciary. Egypt has a highly centralized and paternalistic political 
culture which endorses the dominant presidency.”455 
This attitude was also reflected on the local level of administration. Law No. 145 of 
1988 not only replaced the term “Local Government”, formerly introduced by Sadat, 
by “Local Administration”. Moreover, the local popular councils were henceforth 
completely controlled by the governors, tantamount to the state machinery, for the 
party list system for elections, abrogated by the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) 
in 1990, was retained at the local level. And since in by far most of the local 
constituencies NDP candidates won uncontested, thus control of the government 
party over the local councils was ensured (e.g. in the 1992 local council elections, 
competition between political parties took place only in 15 percent of 
constituencies).456 But restriction of political participation on the local level was even 
more tightened in 1994 by the so-called ‘Ummad Law, which stipulated, that the 
‘Umda and Shaykhs, the formal and informal leaders at the village level, henceforth 
were to be appointed instead of elected, “to maintain more democracy and 
security”.457 
Already under Sadat, admission of political parties was extremely difficult. The 
Committee of Political Parties Affairs, being in charge of licensing, consisted of the 
Ministers of Justice, of Interior Affairs, and of the People’s Assembly, as well as three 
ex-Judges chosen by the President, and was chaired by the president of the Maglis 
al-Shura. Several laws promulgated between 1977 and 1993 hampered the 
registration of political parties, the major ones being mentioned here: 
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Law No. 40, article 4, item 3 of 1977 banned all political parties, which were predicted 
on social classes, religion, gender, or on a geographical or ethnical basis. This article 
aimed particularly to deny the Muslim Brotherhood recognition as a political party. 
In the following year, Law No. 33, article 4 banned all persons from political activity, 
who had corrupted political life before the 1952 revolution – members of the 
government party NDP were, of course excluded from this stipulation. This article 
was directed against the New Wafd Party, which had, as the successor of the 
powerful former Wafd, frequently criticized President Sadat. However, the SCC 
abrogated this article as being unconstitutional on 21 June 1986 458 , “allowing 
hundreds of prerevolutionary politicians and public figures to return to political life.”459 
Law No. 36, article 4, item 6 of 1979 banned all political parties who opposed the 
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Accords of Camp David concluded in the same year. On the 
basis of this article, party leaders also could be sued for criticizing President Sadat, 
his policy, or any member of the executive.460 Again the SCC disagreed with this 
stipulation and in 1988 forced the legalization of the opposition Nasserist Party, 
which had been denied a license by the Political Parties Committee on that 
grounds.461 
In 1983, Electoral Law 114 raised the number of delegates to the People’s Assembly 
from 380 to 448, whilst the number of constituencies was reduced from 176 to 48, 
and in 31 of these, one seat was reserved for women. Moreover, ten additional 
deputies were to be appointed by the President, raising their total number to 458. 
Henceforth no independent candidates were admitted to run for the Assembly, and a 
party had to gain at least 8 per cent of the total national vote to be represented in 
parliament. Moreover, if a party did not reach a certain percentage in one 
constituency, its votes were to be added to the majority party. Although the SCC 
ruled both the prohibition on individuals running as independents and the transfer of 
surplus votes to the majority party as invalid, the 8 per cent requirement for 
representation in the People’s Assembly was maintained. 
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From 1986 to 1990, Law No. 1988 ruled, that in each constituency, one independent 
candidate was permitted to run for parliamentary elections, but this candidate had to 
gain at least 20 per cent of the votes in the electoral district. 
Finally, Law No. 108 of 1992 prohibited both any political activity before a party had 
acquired official recognition by the Committee for Political Parties Affairs (which was 
again directed against the Muslim Brethren) and foreign contacts (directed against 
the Labour Party).462 Between 1983 and 2000, the Committee granted only two 
parties recognition (besides the NDP and its spin-offs, the right wing-liberal LP and 
the left-national NUPP): the Al-Umma Party and the National Conciliation (Al-Wifak) 
Party. All other political groups had to appeal to the courts for receiving recognition 
as a party, which attached to the judiciary a key role in the establishment of a multi 
party system.463 
Until 2011 there were 12 parties in the People’s Assembly, but since the rigged 
elections of 2010, the NDP held 420 from a total number of 518 seats and thus 
retained its superior position. Only after the Revolution of 2011 and Mubarak’s 
overthrow there are approximately 40 parties in the Assembly, representing a 
spectrum from the far left (Marxists) over centrists and liberals to right wing parties. 
Throughout the whole Mubarak era, the NDP maintained its overwhelming 
dominance in the People’s Assembly not only by stressing the legislative framework, 
but also by intimidating opposition candidates, their electors and independent 
reporters, and foremost by rigging elections. Until 2010, elections in Egypt can 
neither be described as open and free nor as fair. The low voter participation 
demonstrated repeatedly that Egyptians did not feel represented neither by the NDP 
nor by opposition parties. For instance, in 1995, from 30 million people eligible to 
vote (all Egyptians aged over 18) only 21 million registered for the ballot, which 
ultimately resulted in a definite voter participation of only 35 per cent of the elective 
population. The government, of course, asserted a turnout of 50 per cent.464 
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To gain more votes, secular parties repeatedly allied with the popular but from 
elections barred Muslim Brotherhood and put Brethren’s candidates on their lists, 
which only embodied their lacking political programs and credibility.465 This, in turn 
provoked a raise in the number of independent candidates, who either had not been 
nominated by their party or belonged to parties that had decided to boycott elections. 
However, most “independent” candidates originally came from the NDP, and, 
significantly, after the ballots they predominantly defected to the ruling party. E.g. 
after the 1995 elections, 99 of 112 elected “independents” joined the NDP, boosting 
the latter’s percentage of votes from originally 70 to finally 91.8 per cent. The same 
thing happened in the 2000 ballot, when the NDP bounced up from 170 seats (37,4 
per cent) to 388 seats (85,4 per cent).466 At the same time, the almost total exclusion 
of women and Copts on the electoral lists reflected the regime’s attempt to utilize the 
growing religious sentiment in the population. Altogether this provoked that the 
parliamentary system with political parties is up to now not really anchored in the 
huge majority of the Egyptian population. 
However, if a party had overcome the legislative barriers and, despite rigged 
elections, gained seats in the People’s Assembly, it entered a parliament, which was 
“in fact a grouping of yes-men”467, marginalized regarding its legislative function and 
reduced to assist the President in promulgating his decrees. The Egyptian Parliament 
is a bicameral system with the legislative People’s Assembly as the Lower House 
and the Consultative Council (Maglis al-Shura) as the Upper House. But whereas the 
Assembly, according to chapter 4, part two of the 1971 constitution (particularly the 
articles 86468 and 124-131469), is de jure empowered with legislative authority and 
control over the executive branch, this authority was de facto hardly ever executed 
and parliament was widely perceived as a puppet in the hands of the government 
respectively the president. This can be illustrated easily by comparing the number of 
bills presented by the cabinet and by members of parliament. For instance, in 
1988/89, cabinet members presented 345 draft bills to the Assembly of which 234 
were discussed and all approved. In the same period, MPs presented none. In 1991, 
the cabinet presented 564 draft bills, of which 451 were discussed and all approved, 
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while only seven draft bills were presented by MPs of which only one was 
approved.470 
The Egyptian political masquerade reached a bizarre highlight in July 2000, when the 
SCC considered both the 1990 and the 1995 elections unlawful and thus declaring 
the country’s parliament illegitimate. But though the subsequent elections of 2000 
were the first ones to be held under full judicial supervision, the NDP, as usual, 
gained an overwhelming majority of 87,8 per cent in the People’s Assembly.471 
Besides, also parliamentary means of control like questions and formal requests 
were mostly used by NDP deputies, whilst only the strongest control tool, the 
interpellation, was frequently used by independent delegates and sometimes also by 
opposition parties (and, naturally, not at all by NDP MPs).472 
Considering such a weak performance of the People’s Assembly in general and of 
the opposition in particular it does not surprise, that political parties have not a good 
reputation in Egypt. The Egyptian writer Alaa Al Aswani (born 1957) put it into the 
following words: “Most of these parties are paper puppets on strings held by the 
regime. Some of the party leaders cooperate with the security agencies and some of 
them are such favorites of the regime (which they claim to oppose) that they are 
appointed members of the upper house of parliament.”473 And Osman notes, that 
even Mahmoud Abaza, at that time head of the New Wafd Party, “in 2009 described 
his party’s role in Egyptian politics as ‘stirring debate’ – not as participation in 
decision making”.474 
Since most political parties play only a marginal role in parliament, had to go to the 
courts for being licensed for political activity and were shown faint response in the 
population until the Revolution of 2011, we shall have a look only at the four biggest 
parties represented in the Assembly since the end of the 1970s, when Sadat officially 
introduced the multi party system: 
The Liberal Party (Hizb al-Ahrar, abbr. LP) arose in 1976 from the right wing platform 
of the former ASU and had supported Sadat’s al-infitah as well as his pro-Western 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
470 Fahmy, The Politics of Egypt, 48. 
471 Hassan, „State versus society in Egypt,“ 323. 
472 Fahmy, The Politics of Egypt, 90-92. 
473 Alaa Al Aswani, On the State of Egypt: The Issues That Caused the Revolution 
(Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2011), 63. 
474 Osman, Egypt on the Brink, 190. 
? 91 
foreign policy, including the Peace Accords of Camp David. Therefor it lost credibility 
and public support and aligned with a more Islamist doctrine, resulting in an alliance 
with the Muslim Brethren in 1987.475 It was therefore also called the party of capital 
and of God but, as Raymond Hinnebusch, Professor of International Relations and 
Middle East Studies at the University of St. Andrews commented, “The ideological 
combination of religiosity and property is a familiar stamp of conservatism elsewhere, 
but in Egypt, where the bourgeoisie is traditionally liberal and the religious right 
illiberal, the attempt to combine them was not apparently viable.”476 The party’s 
program demanding both Sharia as a main source of legislation and freedom of the 
press, of expression and thought as well as independence of the judiciary could not 
work in the long run. In the elections of 1995 and 2000 the LP gained only one seat 
in the Assembly, in the 2005 ballot no seat at all, and henceforth played only a 
marginal role.477 
The Nationalist Unionist Progressive Party (Hizb al Tagammu’ al-Watani al-Taqadomi 
al-Wahdawi, abbr. NUPP) emanated, also in 1976, from the left-wing platform of the 
ASU and considers itself as the defender of the principles of the 1952 Revolution, 
particularly in its rejection of any religious extremism.478 Its composition of Marxists, 
Arab Nationalists, Nasserites, Social Democrats and Liberal Independents 
represents a contradictory amalgam as well. 479 But the Tagammu, as it is commonly 
known, could establish its reputation as being an authentic opposition to the regime 
since the hunger riots of 1977 and, after all, win six seats both in the 1990 and the 
2000 elections.480 In the first free elections in December 2011/January 2012 it won 
five seats within the social-liberal electoral alliance “Egyptian Bloc” and hence gained 
the second best result of an Egyptian party existing already before the 2011 
Revolution.481 
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However, in the Mubarak era the real challenge to the Tagammu was the other leftist 
party, the Socialist Labour Party (Hizb al-a’mal, abbr. SLP). By creating this party in 
1978, Sadat wanted to replace the NUPP as a loyal opposition, but the SLP thwarted 
this plan. The party repeatedly attacked his economic liberalization policy and 
exposed cases of corruption and abuse of power by leading NDP personalities. 
Under Mubarak, the SLP undertook a shift in direction, away from a secular towards 
a religious party, its leadership contracting a triple-alliance with the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the LP for the 1987 elections. But the Islamist party leader, Ibrahim 
Shoukry, an ex-member of Young Egypt, determined the new religious line without 
consulting or even informing other party members. Though the SLP won 56 seats in 
the 1987 elections (whereof 35 went to the Muslim Brethren), the internal 
contradictions in the party provoked a split into two factions two years later, a 
religious one under Shoukry, and a secular one. Accusations of a breach of the 
constitution in 1992 made it impossible for the SLP to run for the 2000 elections.482 
For the 2011/12 elections after the Revolution, the SLP was renamed as Egyptian 
Arabic Socialist Party and joined the Democratic Alliance for Egypt, formed by the 
Muslim Brotherhood and led by the Brethren’s Freedom and Justice Party. It gained 
one seat in the People’s Assembly and has recently changed its name again to 
Egyptian Islamic Labour Party.483 
The re-formation of the Wafd as New Wafd Party in 1978 was already mentioned in 
the previous chapter. The NDP soon assigned some writers and intellectuals to 
attack its then leader, Fu’ad Siraj al-Din, former secretary-general of the old Wafd, as 
the “former feudatory” and the “mummy that escaped the museum”.484 But the New 
Wafd made its mark by fighting Sadat’s “Pyramids Plateau Project”, wherein a 
Western tourism developer should get land at nominal prices around the Pyramids of 
Giza. Eventually, and after widespread public outrage, the project was stopped, but 
the New Wafd was forced to dissolve itself. Under Mubarak, the regime attempted to 
hamper the re-establishment of the party by arguing, that, due to its dissolution in 
1978, the party license was invalid. But in 1983, an administrative court did not agree 
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with this view and enabled the re-emergence of the New Wafd in the same year.485 In 
order to overcome the 8 per cent barrier in the 1984 parliamentary elections, it 
formed an alliance with the Muslim Brethren and modified its secular stance, 
henceforth demanding the implementation of Sharia law. This was a historical 
precedent intimidating both secular and Coptic followers, since the Wafd was 
traditionally the only political force in Egypt, in whose leadership Muslims and Copts 
were represented equally to their proportion in the population. Therefore, the alliance 
with the Brethren was suspended immediately after the 1984 elections, but due to 
factionary rivalries the New Wafd won in the 1987 elections only 35, in 1995 six and 
in 2000 only seven seats. Until today the party stands for a liberal-right to 
conservative-national-liberal policy.486 In the first free elections of 2011/12 it had a 
remarkable comeback, could re-establish its traditionally good reputation and gain 38 
seats in the People’s Assembly.487 
Aside of rigged elections and the weak performance of opposition parties in the 
People’s Assembly, there are other reasons for the missing backing of political 
parties among most Egyptians. First, party leaders do not differ at all from the 
President or the NDP in their undemocratic and authoritarian leadership. They 
continuously appear to be extremely repressive and intolerant against both internal 
as well as external opposition. This lack of confidence to political competitors 
thwarted common strategies against the government or the NDP. Second, there are 
no internal regulations limiting the party leader’s period of office, which resulted in 
extremely long leaderships, sometimes even until death. Then, the factional rivalries, 
often stirred by the NDP, played a significant role. The alliances of the New Wafd 
(1984), the LP and the SLP (1987) with the Muslim Brethren were contradictive to 
their originally secular programs, and the split e.g. of the SLP into a religious and a 
secular faction eventually resulted in a lack of credibility. The government played this 
game perfectly, according to the Latin motto “divide et impera”. For instance, it 
licensed the Nasserite Party to weaken the Marxist-Nasserite alliance, which was the 
core of the NUPP. The formation of the LP was intended to weaken the New Wafd, 
and the registration of the social-democratic and moderate religious Umma Party in 
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1984 should diminish the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood.488 Moreover, several 
opposition parties depended on government subsidies or on government newspapers, 
which undermined their credibility and called their independence from the 
government into question.489 
Altogether, this did not only result in a lack of backing in the population but also made 
it extremely difficult for political parties to produce the needed political cadres. 
Tribalism and patronage played traditionally a major role in the selection of 
candidates, and all parties intensified these traditional instincts both by courting 
influential Sheiks and other well-known personalities as well as by promising money, 
privileges and other benefits previously to elections. Hence, political parties were 
more “parties of persons”, not elected for their ideology or program, but for their 
promises preceding ballots. 490  Thereby, a differentiated party system could not 
emerge. 
 
3.4 Forerunners to the Revolution and the tricky issue of Islam and 
democracy 
“Subjective, conflicting interpretations of divine law which assert their 
veracity above all others have torn the country apart. We are all the be 
held responsible for these rifts, for these schisms.”491 
Due to the legislative restrictions against opposition parties regarding their admission 
to political activity, electoral laws that abet the government party, rigged ballots, and 
the party’s weak performance in the Assembly, the population lost its interest during 
the Mubarak era both in elections and political parties. Amr el-Shobky, an expert in 
Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, states, “With the only exception 
of the three main opposition parties – the Wafd, Nasserist and Tajammu – Egyptian 
political parties do not constitute a current in political life and they have no role to 
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play in connection with social movements or trade unions. [?] Thus the majority of 
them have not get involved with the public in any political or social struggle.”492 
On the other hand, in the 1980s some of Sadat’s controversial laws were quietly 
shelved by President Mubarak, thousands of prisoners were freed, and the 
censorship of the press was relaxed. Consequently, civil associations proliferated 
and, “Professional syndicates were allowed to play an increasingly visible political 
role (especially in demanding civil liberties).493 For example, the SCC facilitated the 
rebirth of the Lawyer’s Syndicate, which was, particularly with its journal al-
Mahommah, throughout the 1980s “at the forefront of calls for political and judicial 
reform.”494 Hassan indicates, that in 1988, there were some 27.000 civil society 
organizations in Egypt495, and 20 years later, by the end of 2008, their number rose 
to 30.000, including labor unions, professional syndicates, business associations and 
the student movement. Hassan lists 115 trade and industry chambers, 24 
professional syndicates, and 22 workers’ unions, organized under a common 
federation, further 24 officially registered political parties, as well as a multitude of 
sports, youth, and social clubs and cooperatives. However, only a minority of these 
organizations was active, and religious as well as development associations together 
represented more than half of all associations. 496  Furthermore, the Muslim 
Brotherhood exerted increasing influence particularly on the most important 
professional syndicates by infiltrating and henceforth dominating their boards, like the 
physicians, engineers, and even the pharmacist’s syndicate with its 60 per cent 
Christian members. 
In 1993, the regime reacted to this development by promulgating the Unified Law, 
“which gave the government greater power to intervene directly in the internal 
elections of professional syndicates.” 497  Fahmy not only mentions these legal 
limitations on syndicates, which were intended to limit their political participation, but 
also states that government intervention took place “through dissolution, interference 
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in syndicate elections, the use of coercion and the threat of abolition”.498 Eventually, 
after a softer phase in the early 1980s, the Mubarak regime tightened its grip again in 
the early 1990s, for not only political parties, but also the press and the syndicates 
were in fact “not supposed to evolve into viable opposition or real agents of change; 
they were pawns in a game controlled by the regime.”499 
But it was not only the Mubarak regime, which hampered civil organizations in their 
efforts to mobilize the public for its own specific interests in society. Civil society 
organizations themselves were contributing to the harassment of other elements of 
civil society with whom they disagreed on certain matters. Even secular, “liberal” 
associations time and again have “shown extreme intolerance to individuals and 
groups, usually Islamists”.500 Besides, though there was a steady increase since the 
1980s in the number of Human Rights organizations and social movements, it must 
be admitted, that many of these organizations “are elitist in nature, and do not reflect 
the deeper way of thinking of the masses in Egyptian Society. Proof of that, most of 
these organizations are located in Cairo and Giza.”501 NGOs, for instance, neither 
featured internal democracy and transparency, nor did they mobilize the population 
to demand democratic reforms. Above all, the regime was successful in co-opting 
NGO leaders and activists and in creating organizations supposedly working in the 
fields of advocacy and human rights, but actually serving the regime’s interests by 
appearing democratic to its Western allies. Nadine H. Abdallah from the Al-Ahram 
Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo therefor concluded in 2008, “One 
must ask, then, whether these organizations are generally reinforcing the 
government’s authoritarianism rather than challenging it.”502 
However, there were sometimes also positive effects civil society had on significant 
groups of Egyptian society and in some cases they probably influenced the further 
course of events up to the 2011 Revolution. One of these movements appeared 
more than six years before the “Arab Spring”. When it became clear that Hosni 
Mubarak wanted to run for a fifth six-year term of his presidency and, moreover, 
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install his son Gamal as his successor, in the fall of 2004 the Kefaya (“Enough”) 
movement emerged. It united personalities from different areas of social and political 
life (e.g. oppositional MPs, artists, moderate Muslims) and gained attention by 
organizing numerous strikes and protest rallies.503 Kefaya practiced an exhilarant 
form of protest by employing creative tactics (like a candlelight freedom vigil in front 
of Saad Zaghlul’s mausoleum shortly before the 2005 presidential elections) and also 
“set up and directed a number of activist opposition groupings across key professions, 
for example ‘Journalists for Change’, ‘Doctors for Change’ and ‘Workers for 
Change’.504 But the heterogeneity of the movement, which was, aside the innovative 
use of modern communication technologies like Internet and mobile phones for 
organizing mass protests, a huge benefit, should finally become its biggest problem. 
On the one hand, Kefaya never got beyond pure activism, on the other, the differing, 
partly antithetic political visions of its protagonists prevented a consistent appearance 
of the movement to the public. Therefore, already in 2007, Kefaya played only an 
inferior role in society.505 
Nevertheless, the last decade of the Mubarak era was characterized by repeated 
public protests, mainly in the big cities of Lower Egypt, like the strikes and riots of the 
textile workers in Kafr el-Dawar and in Mahalla al-Kobra.506 Besides, many new, 
leftist and secular liberal political parties and groups emerged since then, preparing 
the ground for the 2011 revolution. But their influence was limited to the educated, 
urban population. Dr. Mahmoud Shokry and Muhammad Shalaby, two political 
activists from the Justice Party (Hizb ElAdl), founded shortly after the revolution, 
reasoned in the following excerpt of an interview, which the author did in August 
2011 in Cairo, about their and the Muslim Brethren’s understanding of democracy: 
Dr. Shokry: “I think freedom and democracy in a political sense mean the 
same all over the world”. – Muhammad Shalaby: “But if you ask Muslim 
Brotherhood, they will answer differently. For they have a different meaning 
of freedom and democracy, which is restricted.” – Dr. Shokry: “Even the 
simple people on the country know that we had a faked democracy, and what 
real democracy is – and that is: choosing freely, who is going to rule you.”507 
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Actually, the Islamist movements, and in particular the Muslim Brotherhood was by 
far the most influential and successful opposition group against the government, and 
it was the only one broadly based in society. The formation of this radical 
organization in 1928 was already mentioned in chapter 2.3, as well as its changeful 
history characterized by repeated proscriptions throughout the liberal era as well as 
after the 1952 Revolution. The problematic relationship between the Brethren and the 
ruling elites made the movement even more attractive to the mass of Egyptians, 
especially in rural areas, where they took care of the poor and benefited from their 
highly efficient social services infrastructure. This matrix of social services implied 
“affordable healthcare in the form of ‘Islamic hospitals’, ‘non-corrupt’ food distribution 
centres in poor neighbourhoods, practical assistance in finding jobs (especially 
targeted at newly graduated Muslims), welfare benefits, innovative transport solutions 
in some of Cairo’s and Alexandria’s most crowded suburbs, accommodation for out-
of-town students (in addition to lecture notes and study groups) and humanitarian 
activities in some of Egypt’s most deprived areas.”508 
The thousands of Egyptian working emigrants to the Gulf States and particularly to 
Saudi Arabia since the 1970s, where they became acquainted with Wahabism, a 
local radical conservative interpretation of Islam, the alienation of Egyptians from 
their regime, which followed a conciliatory policy towards the USA and its ally Israel, 
and the risky strategy of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak, to exploit the popularity of 
various Islamist groups in order to consolidate their own hegemony consistently 
strengthened the Muslim Brotherhood. The alliances of the Brethren (although not as 
an official party) with the New Wafd (1984) as well as with the LP and the SLP (1987) 
mentioned in the previous chapter, demonstrate Mubarak’s hope “that the moderate 
Islamists would succeed in mobilising the masses against the extremist Islamists.”509 
Actually, during the Mubarak era the Muslim Brethren abandoned their radical image 
and turned towards a more moderate, pragmatic line, which was manifested in their 
strategy of a “legal march through institutions”510 like syndicates or, via independent 
candidates, to the People’s Assembly. Thus, “By taking over some of the country’s 
most important, and traditionally secular, groupings, the Brotherhood was gaining 
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significant political power and actually realizing its objective of a cultural Islamization 
of society.” 511  Just as well, in 2004, the Brethren called for a “republican, 
parliamentarian, constitutional and democratic system within the framework of 
Islamic principles”.512 
But the more moderate appearance of the Brethren led to several splits in the 
movement, and many radicals joined the Salafiyya, which goes back to the 14th 
century and propagates an extremely conservative interpretation of Islam, trying to 
revive law and practices of the Prophet’s time. They want to establish a theocratic 
state similar to the Wahabi regime in Saudi Arabia, by which they are also supported 
financially. Salafi groups were also responsible for more than 700 terrorist attacks 
between the late 1970s and the late 1990s against various institutions and officials, 
but also against Copts and tourists, like the 1997 massacre in Luxor, carried out by 
Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya. 513  Meanwhile, the Muslim Brethren could expand their 
popularity among the pious mass of Egyptians, particularly after disasters like the 
earthquake of winter 1992, when “fundamentalist groups were in the forefront offering 
aid and succour to the needy.” 
All this resulted in the Muslim Brotherhood’s big successes in the elections of 2005 
(88 seats in the Assembly)514, 2010 (no seat, after the government had rigged the 
elections)515 and 2011/12 (213 seats for the Brethren’s “Freedom and Justice Party” 
plus 22 seats for the other 7 allied parties in the “Democratic Alliance for Egypt”) and 
also caused the victory of their candidate Mohamed Morsi in the presidential 
elections of May 2012. Besides, the voter turnout of more than 60 per cent was, 
significantly, the highest one in the country’s history. Even more than by the 
Brethren’s success the Western civilization was shocked by the surprisingly good 
results for the Salafists in the 2011/12 elections. Their Islamist Bloc, led by the party 
Al Nour (“The Light”), which was founded as recently as May 2011, gained nearly 28 
per cent of the votes. Thus, the Democratic Alliance, led by the Brethren, and the 
Islamist Bloc, together won more than two thirds of the seats in the People’s 
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Assembly516, arousing fears in the Western countries that Egyptian society might 
further radicalize in the future. 
The issue “Islam and democracy” is in fact a hot potato, bearing in mind, that in the 
Western discourse, most political scientists associate democracy with Christian 
traditions. In fact, all old democracies like the USA, Great Britain, Canada, New 
Zealand, Australia, Switzerland etc., were founded in societies culturally conditioned 
by Christianity. Non-Christian nations, like the Arab World, are mostly no 
democracies. According to the organization “Freedom House”, at the beginning of the 
third millennium, around 90 per cent of all “free” or “democratic” countries are 
historically conditioned by Christianity, whilst from the 47 Islamic states (with a 
majoritarian Muslim population), more than 90 per cent are no “free” societies.517 
This paper by far cannot give an exhaustive examination of the subject, but the 
author nevertheless intends to give some glimpses to and considerations of this topic.  
The issue is so complex because, different from the hierarchic, monarchic structure 
of catholic Christianity with its clergy and the pope on top, there is no ultimate human 
authority in Islam. Subsequently, there is not “the one Islam” neither in Egypt or in the 
whole Arab World, nor in other Islamic countries like multicultural Indonesia, official 
laical Turkey, or shiite Iran. Since many centuries, Islam and Sharia have been 
taught and practiced in different ways throughout the Islamic world. 
First of all, there is a basic difference between divine law, represented by Sharia, and 
human finding of justice (fiqh), represented by the four different traditional schools of 
law in Sunni Islam (Madh’hab), namely Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’I, and Hanbali (the latter 
one hardly existing in Egypt). Therefore, Sharia provides a general setting of rules 
and values, like justice, freedom, equality, responsibility, and participation (shura), 
which have to be applied in a both sensitive and flexible way, according to a 
continuously changing environment. Important in this connection are the concept of 
common welfare (maslaha ‘amma) and the five basic principles (the protection of 
religion, life, offspring, property, and either reason or honor).518 Today, and according 
to the principle of shura, the idea of a representative parliamentary system is widely 
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accepted (parliamentarianism itself is frequently being claimed by Muslims as having 
its seeds in Islam), and even the Muslim Brethren proclaim, that in an Islamic State, 
authority is derived from the people.519 
However, there are western critics who state that, “the Islamist’s perpetual argument 
that their agenda not only embraces democracy but in fact takes it to a higher level of 
true popular participation is eyewash [?,for] the Muslim Brotherhood and their like 
make political participation of individuals in society subject to the principles of the 
sharia – no one, after all, is ‘bigger than Islam.’”520 The crucial point is that, though 
Koran provides much evidence regarding “right” action and the principles of a “just” 
order, it does not provide a comprehensive concept regarding the relationship 
between individual, state and society521, which leaves the creation of constitutions 
and political theories in general up to interpretation. Therefor, it is significantly 
important, in which way Sharia is interpreted and applied, for Islam is conceptually 
political itself, and in the understanding of conservative Muslims, a state based on 
Sharia is actually a constitutional state.522 
Due to this unclear theological situation, there is much contradiction in statements of 
Koran scholars and Muslim jurists. This indistinct religious tradition caused many 
contradictive statements up to the present. Bradely quotes the prominent Muslim 
Brotherhood deputy Hamdy Hassan, whom he met a few months after the 2005 
parliamentary elections, and thereby illustrates, how divergent religious tradition can 
be utilized by Muslim representatives to conceal their real intentions: “’In an Islamic 
country there is complete freedom of expression for all the people,’ Hassan said 
matter-of-factly. ‘Islamic history emphasizes this point very clearly. In the past, every 
citizen had the right to speak to the leader of the Muslim community or nation 
whenever they liked: men and women, citizens and non-citizens, Muslims and non-
Muslims. An Islamic state does not differentiate between these people. This is the 
basis of our religion, and not a question of politics. This would be part of our 
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constitution, because the Qur’an is our constitution. Why do we make people slaves 
when they are born free?’”523 
If we take the sentence about Koran seriously, it should be mentioned, that until 
nowadays most Muslims have a mental blockade forbidding any critical text analysis 
of their holy book. But the so-called Cairene Koran, first edited and published on the 
initiative of King Fu’ad by Al-Azhar scholars in 1923, which is widely accepted and 
used in- and outside the Islamic world as the best one available, is far-off being a 
scientifically edited, historical-critical edition (e.g. compared to current editions of the 
Bible). 524  However, the compatibility of Islamic faith with (Western) democratic 
standards is a question of interpretation, and issues like plurality and freedom of 
opinion, separation of powers, a multi-party system and the role of unions are 
controversially discussed and still heavily disputed amongst Islamic scholars. 
Actually, such issues are very often mingled with religious morality, and the term 
“virtue” is widely used – or misused – in political and social matters.525 
Another reference, how Islam and democracy could be brought together, maybe the 
detailed political platform the Muslim Brotherhood laid down in October 2007, the first 
party platform since Hasan al-Banna’s paper “Towards the Light” (nahwa al-nur) of 
1938. In the new party platform, the Brethren admitted their conviction to an Islamic 
state based on Shura and Sharia (without explaining how they exactly understood 
the latter). Therefor, they did not aim at a theocratic but at a civil state on religious 
foundations, in which the president should be elected and legitimized by the people, 
and in which the army should be restricted to defending the nation. Besides 
economical, social and educational aspects the platform also contains their 
commitment to freedom of faith, of opinion and of assembly, the right to protest 
peacefully, and the right for political participation. Nevertheless, another stipulation 
demands a board of Muslim clerics, which should oversee the government and turn 
down laws supposedly contradicting Sharia. The equality of men and women and the 
political role of Copts are issues, which demonstrate the real attitude of Muslims 
towards such matters like “equality” and “justice”, and there is in fact a stipulation in 
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the program banning women and particularly Christians from presidency.526 Therefor, 
“The president cannot be a woman because the post’s religious and military duties 
‘conflict with her nature, social and other humanitarian roles,’ the document said. 
Amazingly, the blueprint reportedly discussed women’s issues under its ‘Issues and 
Problems’ chapter, alongside other ‘problems’ like unemployment and child labor. 
While underlining ‘equality between men and women in terms of their human dignity,’ 
it warned against ‘burdening women with duties against their nature or role in the 
family.’”527 
This illustrates that superiority of Islam in all aspects of life might find its way into 
public, social and political life with the Muslim Brethren’s (and probably much more 
with the Al Nour Party’s) rise to power. Finally, an Islamic state is based on divine law, 
and therefor deprived of any earthly authority528, which easily can be utilized to 
disrespect the rights and demands of individuals and minorities in the country like 
women, Copts and Bedouins, not to speak of artists, atheists, gays and other groups, 
which were traditionally discriminated in Egypt. In an interview with the author of this 
paper, Ali Mohamedin, a local Shaykh of El-Ezba village in Luxor/Westbank, 
answered questions regarding the compatibility of Islam and democracy by referring 
to general expressions derived from Sharia like, “When Islam comes, it will come with 
justice”, or “Islam came to make people equal”, but on the other hand he justified 
male polygamy with the following illustrious metaphor: “Man is like a river – many 
women can drink from him.”529 
However, the power, which the Islamist’s gained in the first free parliamentary and 
presidential elections in 2011/12, soon revealed its problematic aspect: The other 
side of the coin is, that political success also results in responsibility. The Brethren’s 
Freedom and Justice Party with their 213 deputies in the People’s Assembly (the 
Democratic Alliance having in total 235 of 508 seats), and the Salafist’s Al Nour Party 
with 107 seats (the Islamist Bloc having 123 seats in total) have inherited not only 
power, but also political responsibility. Particularly after President Mohamed Morsi 
had ousted out of power the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and its 
head, Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, in August 2012, the Islamists will be judged by 
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their efforts in fighting poverty, bad education, corruption, and in enabling more social 
groups to participate actively in the political life of Egypt. 
The bad education system is probably the biggest problem in nowadays Egypt. 
Though modern means of communication like Facebook and Twitter have supported 
the organization of opposition groups, these media are limited to young, urban, 
mostly well-educated social classes. Nora Shalaby, archeologist and Twitter activist, 
stated in August 2011: “Education should now be priority number one. The education 
system is horrible. We have 40 per cent illiterate people.”530 And Ebtihal Shedid, 
another political activist and editor of “Transit Blog” argued, that real democracy in 
Egypt would finally emerge only through better education of the masses.531 
This chapter was opened with a quotation taken from the English subtitles of the film 
“Le Destin” (al-Massir) by Egyptian director Youssef Chahine, which deals with the 
banishment of the famous Spanish-Arabic polymath Averroes (Ibn Rushd) living in 
the 12th century, a time of increasing religious fanaticism and intolerance. It shall be 
closed with another citation of that movie, a dialogue between Averroes and the 
Almohad caliph al-Mansur, reflecting the rise of Islamist movements during the 
Mubarak era: 
Averroes: “People are exploiting religion and you’re letting them. They’re 
the only ones we hear in the mosques.” – Al-Mansur: “You’d be heard if you 
were as eloquent as these men of faith.” – Averroes: “Merchants of faith, if 
you ask me. Whether they rant on about Arab victories or about religion, 
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“Democracy is the will of the majority“ (Cairo, Tahrir Square, 1 August 2011) 




“NO TO MILITARY GOVERNMENT 
Black circle – don’t vote for: the thief, the illiterate, the rowdy, the one who just makes 
promises – civil war. 
White circle – vote for: the trustworthy one, the lettered one, the honorable one, the 
one who keeps his promises – Egypt.” 
(Graffiti, Luxor, 26 December 2011) 





During the past 200 years of Egyptian history, authoritarian rule was the normal 
political condition and participation of broader groups of society the exception. 
Nevertheless, after the reign of Mehmed Ali, who had initiated economical and 
administrative reforms only to strengthen his authority and to secure succession of 
his male heirs, participatory elements can be found in the state’s institutions both on 
local and national level. The first native Egyptians, that achieved some kind of 
representative participation, were the local notables. Already Mehmed Ali chose them 
to collect taxes and to represent the government on the local level, e.g. in the villages. 
It was also Mehmed Ali, who first recruited native peasants, the fellahin, to the army. 
Under the reign of Ismail, Egyptians were also allowed to advance in military ranks, 
which should later on prepare the ground for the first national movements. Meanwhile, 
European residents in Egypt were guaranteed judiciary privileges by the 
establishment of Mixed Courts in 1876. Ismail’s financial problems forced him to 
establish Egypt’s first Consultative Assembly – not a parliament from a Western point 
of view, because e.g. the idea of opposition to the Khedivial appointed government 
was completely alien to the deputies. Nevertheless, the rural notables, being the 
most prominent members of this Maglis Shura al-Nuwwab, were for the first time 
involved in the national legislative process. In early 1879, Ismail’s financial and 
political troubles with the European powers forced him to offer further constitutional 
concessions to the Assembly and provided the deputies extended rights regarding 
financial control. In April of the same year, the Khedive for the first time integrated 
native Egyptians into ministerial office. The turbulent years of the Urabi revolt 
resulted in even more power granted to the notables. Threatened by Khedive 
Tawfiq’s anger, Urabi welcomed their support. In turn, the notables gained more 
influence in the country’s administration and policy, and on 14 September 1881, for 
the first time the idea of the separation of powers appeared in an official Egyptian 
document. Rising opposition to the increasing European influence, manifested in 
both British/French ministers in the government, and Dual Control, led Britain to 
intervene in Egypt. During the crisis after the British attack on Alexandria, the Maglis 
al-Urfi, established as an emergency government in August 1882, was the first 
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attempt by Egyptian administrative and military bureaucrats to govern the country 
harmoniously together with the former dominating Turco-Circassian elite. 
After the British occupation of 1882, the power game between the Khedive, the 
British Consul-General and the rural notables, represented in the newly established 
Legislative Council, the General Assembly and the Provincial Councils, was 
characterized by the national struggle for independence and British attempts to divide 
out their Egyptian opponents. Actually, both the Legislative Council and the General 
Assembly were mere puppet institutions for the British did not consider Egyptians fit 
for governing themselves. Tactical political maneuvers continued until after World 
War I, when the British government realized, that the Egyptian nationalist movement, 
mainly represented by the Wafd Party and its charismatic leader Saad Zaghloul, 
were a factor they could no longer ignore. Consequently, Britain unilaterally declared 
Egypt independent in 1922 – with some major exceptions regarding military and 
foreign policy – and the first constitution, drafted by a committee of mainly lawyers, 
was promulgated a year later. In the meantime, various leftist movements including 
Anarchists, Marxists and Socialists had gained some influence among urban 
intellectuals and sought to mobilize Egyptian workers, but due to their strong 
association with foreigners (mainly Italians, Greeks, Armenians and Jews from 
Alexandria) and to their secular ideology, they could never attract major groups of the 
Egyptian working class. Nevertheless, unions were found, and strikes were 
organized. But the main issue since the 1920s was complete independence from 
British rule, which made the Wafd by far the most influential party throughout the 
country. However, Zaghloul’s authoritarian leadership and aggressive style against 
his opponents both inside and outside his own party became exemplary and 
symptomatic for the performance of politicians and made political parties mere 
cliques around their leaders than programmatic ideological organizations rooted in 
the population. This was, however, only one reason, why the so-called liberal 
experiment of the 30 years period between 1922 and 1952 failed. The others were 
socio-economic difficulties, which could not be solved due to misgovernment and 
political intrigues. Altogether this led to the Free Officer’s military coup of July 1952, 
which marked the end of a political era characterized first by political radicalization 
both on the left and right, and second by the struggle between parliament and the 
King on the one side, the latter still wanting to rule authoritarian and therefor 
repeatedly allying with the British High Commissioner on the other side. 
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The “revolution” of 1952 did, however, not extend political participation to broader 
parts of Egyptian society but, on the contrary, reduce it to a clique around Nasser, 
after the latter had ousted his rival Mohamed Naguib, who had preferred a return to 
parliamentary rule. Nasser’s attempts to link the masses with the regime and the 
aims of the revolution failed. The military regime, the abolition of the constitution and 
the ban of all unions and political parties, except Nasser’s Liberation Rally (in 1962 
merged into the Arab Socialist Union), were only accepted for, until 1967, the 
charismatic president benefited from his political success in the Suez Crisis and 
subsequently appeared for the masses throughout the Arab World as the “leader of 
the Arab Nation”. The disastrous defeat of the Egyptian army in the 1967 War by 
Israel destroyed that myth. What was left, was an autocratic military regime that had 
failed to fulfill the people’s hope for a better life because socialist economic reforms 
had not been successful in developing Egypt’s industry, and power was even more 
centralized than before the revolution. Though Nasser’s successor Sadat at first 
sought to base his power more on the rural population and the local notables, local 
government was finally reduced to local administration. Sadat’s al-infitah just 
increased the income gap between a small elite and the poor masses, and the official 
establishment of a multi-party system at the end of the 1970s, including the 
transformation of the ASU into the NDP, was in the end only the implementation of a 
sham democracy, for political parties were restricted both by the legislative as well as 
by a huge state security apparatus. Nevertheless, the establishment of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court in 1979 and the expansion of the administrative court system 
provided both the citizens with another means of challenging the state directly, and 
enabled political parties and organizations to fight for their rights. But increasing 
economic problems and the Peace Treaty with Israel further alienated the mass of 
Egyptians from the regime and strengthened religious fundamentalists, resulting in 
Sadat’s assassination. The Muslim Brethren, whom already Nasser and Sadat, and 
also Mubarak hoped to utilize for securing their hegemony by weakening more 
radical groups, turned out to be the only credible opposition to the omnipotent NDP 
around the president. Elections were rigged, the opposition bullied, and parliament 
was only a group of yes-men. After a short period of relaxation of censorship and the 
repressive state apparatus in the early 1980s, the Mubarak regime tightened its grip 
against the opposition a few years later. When the president tried to secure 
succession of his son Gamal, for the first time, civil society organizations were 
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formed in a big scale, Kefaya being the most prominent from 2004 to 2006. But these 
movements were limited to urban elites and intellectuals, whilst the mass of the rural 
population trusted more in the Muslim Brethren, who were the only organization, 
which served the poor and unprivileged masses. And though it was the young urban 
elite, using modern communication means, who initiated the Revolution of 2011, the 
turnout of the first free elections brought an overwhelming victory for the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s “Freedom and Justice Party” and the Salafist’s “Al Nour”, leaving 
secular parties, especially the many new ones who were formed just shortly before or 
after the Revolution, far behind. The first freely elected president, ex-member of the 
Brethren, Mohamed Morsi, managed to oust the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces, which had taken over power after Mubarak’s forced resignation from office. 
Since August 2012, Islamists hold the main positions in state institutions, and 
henceforth they will be judged by their actions not by their slogans. 
Since the 19th century, political participation in Egypt was limited to a small elite, and 
the genuinely Islamic principle of Shura or consultation was merely utilized to conceal 
and embellish authoritarian rule. The future will show, if the “Arab Spring” will be 
succeeded by an “Islamist Winter”, if moderate or radical Islamists, exploiting their 
slogan “Islam is the solution”533 will succeed, or if their positive image will soon be 
de-mystified in the mills of political daily grind, and therefor the writer Alaa Al Aswany 
was right by ending each of his weekly articles in the Egyptian liberal newspapers al-
Dustur and al-Shorouk since July 2009 with his predictive phrase “Democracy is the 
solution”.534 
By comparing Western ideas of democracy with their Egyptian conceptualization it 
becomes evident that, besides continuous undermining of democratic and 
constitutional principles by authoritarian rule throughout the past 200 years, and their 
discrediting as being imported by Western (colonial) powers, the major aspects to be 
considered in Egypt are paternalistic traditions and Islam. Altogether these factors 
not only hampered the development of democratic institutions and their rooting 
amongst the population, but also left classic Western principles of democracy 
disputable. In particular, the increasing influence of Islam within the last decades 
created a contradictious discourse in Egyptian society about democratic core values 
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like justice, separation of powers, plurality, and freedom of opinion. Especially 
individual rights and freedom, being fundamental for a multifaceted social and 
political life, apparently contravene the Islamic ideal of harmony and order, in which 
all people unite to contribute and work for a homogenous society. Minorities and 
deviating opinions, particularly if they contradict fundamental Islamic principles, are 
often considered not only as “non Islamic”, but as inimical to official order and to the 
state in general, which, although officially “Arab”, after all, is considered by most 
Egyptians as “Islamic”. As the banner, photographed in August 2011 on Tahrir 
Square (page 103) illustrates, even many Egyptian revolutionaries have not yet 
understood that democracy is not tantamount with the will of the majority, but just as 
well means the protection of minorities and their rights. In a country, where many 
people now in power understand religion not as a private matter, but as the base of 
state and society, this is insofar a problem for a democratic development, as Islam 
claims absoluteness and merely tolerates other opinions, and foremost other 
religions. As long as there is not a clear separation of state and religion, similar to the 
European development since the Age of Enlightenment, this will be a permanent 
cause of social and political conflict. 
And at the time this paper is being completed, in September 2012, the intense riots 
throughout the Islamic World (and particularly also in Cairo and Alexandria), caused 
by the release of a video by an Egyptian-American Copt, in which the Prophet 
Mohamed is being insulted – however dull this film is – demonstrates that most 
Egyptians identify themselves intensively with religious matters. It is still more 
common to many of them to utilize and exploit such occasions for violent protests 
against the “West” than to articulate their discontent with political, economical or 
social problems in their country in the form of a peaceful demonstration or by getting 
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“Destiny” (French: “Le Destin”; Arabic: al-Massir; written by Youssef Chahine and 







By considering Egypt’s history since the period of Mehmed Ali to the Mubarak era, 
this master thesis is aimed at finding participatory elements and traditions in the 
governmental institutions of the state and how these contributed to the development 
of democratic structures. It is mainly based on literary sources, though personal 
interviews with some political activists in Cairo, one anthropologist in Alexandria, and 
a local Shaykh in Luxor, held in August 2011 and September 2012, contributed to 
shed light on the political atmosphere of post-revolutionary Egypt. 
The thesis focuses on the development of parliamentarianism and constitutionalism 
as well as Egyptian history of law and of local government, which reflect the shift in 
influence from a Turco-Circassian elite to native Egyptians, later from the rural 
notables to an urban bourgeoisie, and since the 1952 Revolution to a new elite of 
military officers and bureaucrats coming from the lower middle class. Throughout 
these 200 years Egypt remained overall an authoritarian ruled, centralized country 
with little autonomy on the local level. In the Mubarak era, the role of local councils 
and Sheiks was marginalized while governors became little dictators within their 
provinces. 
Since economic liberalization during the Sadat era, successful businessmen linked to 
the government party NDP became the main base of the regime’s power. The input 
of political movements and socio-economic developments, as well as the complex 
relationship between the rulers and the population as well as the style in leadership 
continuously played a major role in the development of Egypt’s political institutions. 
Some of these movements, like the leftist, never arose to big players in Egyptian 
society, but others, in particular the religious ones like the Muslim Brethren, 
increased their influence up to the present. 
Except for the Wafd, political parties were never based in the mass of the population 
due to their weak performance in parliament and their authoritarian personal 
leadership which reflects in general the way how Egyptians look at their government: 
they mostly do not gear to ideologies or political programs but to persons and what 




Bezug nehmend auf die Geschichte von Mohamed Ali bis Mubarak zielt diese 
Masterarbeit darauf ab, partizipatorische Elemente und Traditionen in den staatlichen 
Institutionen Ägyptens zu finden, und wie diese zur Entwicklung demokratischer 
Strukturen beigetragen haben. Sie basiert hauptsächlich auf literarischen Quellen, 
wenngleich Interviews mit politischen Aktivisten in Kairo, einem Anthropologen in 
Alexandria, sowie einem lokalen Scheich in Luxor dazu beigetragen haben, die 
politische Atmosphäre im post-revolutionären Ägypten zu beleuchten. 
Der Schwerpunkt der Arbeit liegt auf der Entwicklung von Parlamentarismus und 
Konstitutionalismus, sowie auf der Rechtsgeschichte und Lokalverwaltung Ägyptens, 
welche den Einfluss wechselnder Eliten reflektieren: Von einer Turko-
Tscherkessischen Oberschicht hin zu Ägyptern, von ländlichen Großgrundbesitzern 
zur städtischen Bourgeoisie, und seit der Revolution von 1952 hin zu einer neuen 
Elite von Militäroffizieren und Bürokraten aus der unteren Mittelschicht. Während all 
dieser Zeit blieb Ägypten insgesamt ein autoritär regiertes, zentralistisches Land mit 
wenig Autonomie auf der lokalen Ebene. Zur Zeit Präsident Mubaraks wurde die 
Rolle der Gemeinden und der lokalen Scheichs auf Kosten der Gouverneure 
marginalisiert, während letztere zu „kleinen Diktatoren“ in ihren Provinzen aufstiegen. 
Seit der wirtschaftlichen Liberalisierungspolitik unter Sadat wurden zunehmend 
erfolgreiche Geschäftsleute mit guten Beziehungen zur Regierungspartei NDP die 
Hauptstütze des Regimes. Sozio-ökonomische Entwicklungen, verschiedene 
politische Bewegungen, aber auch die komplexen Beziehungen zwischen 
Herrschenden und Bevölkerung, sowie deren jeweiliger Führungsstil spielten immer 
eine wichtige Rolle bei der Entwicklung politischer Institutionen. Einige der 
politischen Bewegungen, wie die Linke, wurden nie Hauptakteure in der ägyptischen 
Gesellschaft, während andere, insbesondere religiöse wie die Muslimbrüder, ihren 
Einfluss bis herauf in die Gegenwart stetig ausbauen konnten. 
Aufgrund ihres angepassten Verhaltens im Parlament und ihrer autoritären 
Führungsstruktur waren außer der Wafd politische Parteien nie in der Bevölkerung 
verwurzelt, welche weniger auf Ideologien oder politische Programme hört, sondern 
mehr auf Personen und deren Versprechungen. 
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